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MATTHEW D. ADLER 
AND SETH F . KREIMER 
THE NEW ETIQUETTE OF 
FEDERALISM: NEW YORK, PRINTZ, 
AND YESKEY 
A majority of the Supreme Court once more believes that state 
autonomy is a fundamental, constitutional value and has set out to 
develop that proposition from case to case. As a result, the Tenth 
Amendment and its penumbrae have recently generated a series 
of intricate, judicially declared limitations on federal power. The 
jurisprudence of federalism has been bedecked with formalistic dis-
tinctions that provide law professors rich opportunity to chase law 
students down a series of hypotheticals and into contradictions. 
While this may be good fun for professors, and occasionally for 
students, one suspects that the new federalism doctrines quickly 
will drive political actors, judges, and practicing lawyers to distrac-
tion. The area lacks a fabric of constitutional law sufficiently co-
herent and well-justified to last. 
This article focuses on the proposition that the federal govern-
ment may not "commandeer" state officials, and the attendant 
doctrines announced by the Court. The anticommandeering doc-
trines are of interest not only because they have impelled the 
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Court to invalidate two federal statutes in the last seven years, but 
because they are both unspecified and potentially explosive. • If de-
veloped expansively, they threaten to undermine the supremacy of 
federal law. 
The doctrines, as announced by the Court in Printz v U1zited 
Statesl and New York v United States/ and reaffirmed last Term in 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v Yes key, 4 create a regime of 
dichotomous boundaries. Like the federa lism jurisprudence set 
forth, a generation ago, in National League of Cities v Usery, 5 the 
new jurisprudence of commandeering purports to define an area 
of total state (and local) immunity from federal intervention.6 Nei-
ther the magnitude of the federal interest nor the degree of inter-
ference with state prerogatives is relevant. Rather, the doctrinal 
boundaries constitute what Justice Kennedy calls "the etiquette of 
federalism," and a federal trespass across those boundaries is per 
se invalid/ 
1 As Professor Tushnet has observed, "[Oine can use the word 'commandeer' to refer to 
almost anything that affects a state's ability to pursue the substantive policies it prefers." 
Mark Tush net, Kttping Your Eye on the 8111/: The Signifi(allct of the Revival of Constitutional 
Federalism, 13 Ga St U L Rev 1065, 1067 (1997). For examples of the potential reach of 
the anticommandcering principle, sec Condon v Rmo, 155 F3d 453 (4th Cir 1998) (invalidat-
ing Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which prohibited dissemination of information con-
tained in state motor vehicle records, as a commandeering); West v Anne Arrmdel County, 
137 F3d 752, 760 (4th Cir 1998) (entertaining claim that application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to state subdivision was a commandeering; rejecting only as a matter of stare 
decisis); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airpo11 Auth. v City of Burbank, 136 F3d 1360, 1364-
65 (9th Cir 1998) (Kozinski concurring) (arguing that empowering state officials to bring 
a preemption claim in federal court might be commandeering). The anticommandeering 
doctrines have already attracted considerable scholarly artemion. See, in particular, l~v:1n 
H. Caminker, Printz, Stott Sovereignty, and tbe LimifJ" of Pom111li.rm, 1997 Supreme Court 
Review 199; Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereigwy and Subo1-dinacy: May Congress CO'Imllaluleer 
State Offi(ers to lmple11ltllt Federal Law? 95 Colum L Rev 1001 (1995); Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr., The Political EconO'IIIY of Cooperative Ft1lrralism: Why State Amonumy Makes Smtt and 
"Dual Sovmigmy" Doem't, 96 Mich L Rev 813 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and 
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? Ill Harv L Rev 2180 (1998). 
1 117 S Ct 2365 (1997). 
j 505 us 144 (1992). 
• 118 S Ct 1952 (1998). 
1 426 US 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v San Amonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Amh., 469 US 
528 (1985). 
6 Although the Tench Amendment refers simply to "States," not localities, and although 
the parallel reference to "State[s]" in the Eleventh Amendment has been read by the Court 
solely to immunize states, nor localities, from suit, the anticonunandeering doctrines protect 
both state and local governments. See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2382 n 15. For the remainder 
of this article, we generally use "state" to mean "state or local." 
1 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) (citing Nm York 
as a case "where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a fonnal command from 
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In such a regime, a great deal hinges on the exact contours of 
the area protected from federal infringement. If they are to be 
consistent with precedent, the doctrinal boundaries that define this 
area must map onto the outcomes of prior cases. If they are to be 
workable, the boundaries must be intelligible and coherent. And 
if they are to be at all intellectually persuasive, the boundaries can-
not be simple result-oriented gerrymanders. Unfortunately, the 
anticommandeering doctrines seem headed for trouble in all three 
dimensions. In this article we seek to clarify as sympathetically as 
possible the doctrinal boundaries between permissible federal reg-
ulation and impermissible commandeering, to assess those bound-
aries in light of the justifications for judicially enforced federalism, 
and to explore the possibility of an expressive justification for the 
boundaries that cannot be otherwise justified.8 
Part I lays out our understanding of the basic pieces of the puz-
zle: the explicit lines of demarcation that the Court has drawn in 
Printz, New York, and Yeskey, and the values that constitutional 
federalism might be understood to realize. Part II argues that be-
hind the explicit lines must lie a more basic distinction, alluded to 
by the Court in Printz, between impermissible commandeering 
and the permissible federal preemption of state law. We flesh out 
the preemption/commandeeripg distinction, but conclude that the 
distinction is only poorly justified by the values of constitutional 
federalism. 
Parts III and IV engage in the same exercise for the lines of 
demarcation explicidy set forth by the case law. Part III addresses 
the three distinctions adopted in New York and Printz: between 
commandeering and conditional funding or preemption, between 
generally applicable and targeted federal statutes, and between com-
mandeering of state officials exercising the judicial function and 
commandeering of other officials. In each case, the boundaries in 
question seem to us both normatively insupportable and practically 
unworkable. Part IV goes to the issue addressed in the most recent 
commandeering case, Yeskey-whether an anticommandeering 
the National Government directing the state to enact a certain policy . . . or to organize 
its governmental functions in a certain way"). 
8 P1-inrz also sketched out a unitary executive argument for the amicommandeering doc-
trine. Sec 117 S Ct at 2378. We have nothing to add to Professor Caminker's persuasive 
criticism of that argument, see 1997 Supreme Court Review at 223-33 (cited in note 1), 
and thus focus here on the federalism argument. 
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prohibition should include an exemption for federal legislation 
adopted to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. We conclude 
that the answer should be "yes," both as a matter of the case law 
and as a matter of federalism values, but also suggest that the task 
of delineating a clear and workable exemption will be a difficult 
one. 
Finally, in Part V we explore, with skepticism, the possibility of 
an expressive justification for the anticommandeering doctrines 
here described. 
I. FIVE LINES OF DEMARCAT.ION IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE 
A. DOCTRINE: LINES OF DEMARCATION 
In dissenting from the Court's 1985 decision to cease enforcing 
state sovereignty constraints on the national government, Justices 
O'Connor and Rehnquist each announced a hope and expectation 
that the Court would return to the fray. 9 In fact, federalism doc-
trine was reinvigorated six years later when Grego1y v Ashcroft in-
troduced a "plain statement rule" 10 for congressional action that 
interferes with "the authority of the people of the States to deter-
mine the qualifications of their most important government offi-
cials."" But it was not until the next year, in New York v United 
States, that the Court actually held a federal statute unconstitu-
tional on federalism grounds. 
In New York, the majority invalidated one part of a federal 
scheme seeking to induce states to make provision for the disposal 
of low-level nuclear waste, and sustained two others. The Court 
drew a line of demarcation between legitimate conditional exer-
cises of the federal spending or preemption power, on the one 
hand, and illegitimate "commandeer[ing]," on the other. 12 The de-
9 Sec Garcia v Sau Antonio Men·opoliton Tramit Amb., 469 US 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist 
dissenting); id at 589 (O'Connor dissenting). 
10 501 us 452, 461 (1991). 
11 Id at 463. The scope of the plain statement rule has proved elusive. Compare City of 
Edmonds v OxfrmJ House, Inc., 514 US 725, 732 n 5 (1995) (land use regulation was not" 'a 
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity'") (quoting Gregory v Asbcroft, 
501 US at 460) with BFP v Resolution Trust Corp., 51 1 US 531, 544 n 8 (1994) ("essential 
sovereign interest in the security and stability of title to land" triggered plain statement 
rule). The Court's optnion in Yeskey, discussed below, does not clarify matters. 
12 505 US at 161 ("Congress may not simply commandeer the legislative processes of 
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program") 
2] THE NEW ETIQUETTE OF FEDERALISM 75 
gree of justification or public necessity was held to be irrelevant; 
commandeering was an irredeemable constitutional violation, 
while conditional spending or preemption was per se consistent 
with constitutional constraints. The New York Court drew a second 
line of demarcation by affirming prior cases upholding the imposi-
tion of federal duties upon state judges; the Court reasoned that, 
as a matter of the text of the Supremacy Clause, judicial officials 
were peculiarly subject to federal demands. 13 Finally, the Court 
suggested that the prohibition on federal commandeering would 
not cover "generally applicable" statutes. 14 
Two Terms ago, in Printz, the Court went one step further. It 
applied the prohibition on commandeering not only to federal 
statutes which mandated policy-making by legislative officials, but 
to the Brady Act, a federal statute that merely imposed on state 
law enforcement officials the obligation to "'make a reasonable 
effort' " 15 to determine whether certain pending firearm purchases 
would be illegal. Printz reiterated the suggestion that statutes of 
general applicability fell outside the coverage of the anticomman-
deering principle. 16 The Court reaffirmed that this principle did 
not apply to statutes imposing federal duties on state judges, and 
clarified that any state official performing judicial functions was 
also subject to commandeering. 17 And the majority in Printz did 
not take issue with the proposition, articulated by the dissent, 18 
that Congress could induce action by state officials through condi-
tional federal spending or preemption.19 
(internal quotation omitted); sec id at 161-69 (distinguishing between commandeering and 
conditional spending or preemption). 
IJ Sec id at 178-79. 
"Id at 177-78. 
11 117 S Ct at 2369 (quoting Brady Act). 
16 See id at 2383. 
11 See id at 2371, 2381 and n 14. It probably would be unwarranted to conclude that 
every directive to state judges and state officials exercising a judicial function, otherwise 
within Congress's Article I powers, is constitutionally permissible. See, for example, HI!Wiett 
v Rose, 496 US 356, 372 (1990) ("The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdic-
tion treat federal law as the law of the land docs not necessarily include within it a require-
ment thar the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim 
is presented"). However, Prnuz and New York clearly exempt judges and state officials exer-
cising a judicial function from the generic prohibition on commandeering. 
IS See id ar 2396-97 (Stevens dissenting). 
19 The majority opinion itself seems explicitly to acknowledge the constitutional legiti-
macy of cooperative federalism programs in the course of its unitary executive discussion. 
See id at 2378 n 12. 
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Pennsylvania Dept of Cot-rections v Yeskry offered the opportunity 
to clarify matters. The Court reviewed the applicability of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the operation of a state 
prison system. The Yeskry petitioners and amici argued before the 
Court not only that the ADA failed the "plain statement" require-
ment of Ashcroft, but that application of the statute to prisons 
would be at odds with Printz, since the statute imposed duties of 
"reasonable accommodation" which could be far more intrusive 
than the Brady Act.20 A unanimous Court, however, saw no need 
to reach the constitutional question. 
justice Scalia's opinion took the position that even if a "plain 
statement mle" applied, it was "amply met" by the terms of the 
ADA.21 The opinion went on to avoid the question whether the 
ADA was barred by Printz, on the ground that the question had 
not been raised before the lower courts.22 Yeskey was, however, illu-
minating in one way. The opinion suggested more directly what 
had been implicit in New Y01··k and Printz: the limits imposed by 
those cases do not apply to congressional enactments rooted in 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Thus, by the end of last Term, the Court had erected an enclave 
of state sovereignty explicitly bounded by four lines of demarca-
tion. In addition, as we will argue below, these four demarcations 
presuppose a fifth, implicit distinction between federal preemption 
and commandeering. A federal requirement will be judged per se 
unconstitutional if: 
1) the requirement commandeers state officials, rather than 
merely preempting state law; and 
2) it does so directly rather than as a condition for federal spend-
ing, or for nonpreemption of state law; and 
3) the requirement is targeted at state officials, rather than being 
generally applicable to state officials and private persons alike; and 
4) tl1e officials commandeered are exercising legislative or execu-
tive ratl1er than judicial functions; and 
5) the requirement is grounded in the Commerce Clause or 
10 See Brief for the Petitioners 23-25; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation 23-24. 
21 118 S Ct at 1954. 
22 See id at 1956. 
lJ See id. See Part N for a discussion of the Section 5 exception. 
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Congress's other Article I powers, rather than in the grants of 
power to Congress in the Reconstruction Amendments. 
A great deal turns on the placement of these boundaries. We 
will suggest that they are both unclear and (with the exception of 
the last) unjustified by the values of federalism that the Court has 
invoked. We begin with a brief review of those values. 
B. THE RATIONALES: THE VALUES OF FEDERALlSM 
What are the arguable values of constitutional federalism? More 
robustly, why might there be good reason to constitutionalize fed-
eralism guarantees and have these guarantees enforced by the Su-
preme Court/4 as in such recent cases as United States v Lopez, 25 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 26 City of Boerne v Flores, 27 and 
the cases of most interest for us, New York and Printz? In this 
Part, we briefly summarize the values or functions that enforceable 
constitutional federalism might be understood to serve, with spe-
cific reference to the Court's own defense of this feature of our 
constitutional system. This summary should not be taken as an 
endorsement. Rather, our claim is conditional: on the assumption 
that constitutional federalism does serve important values, those 
values are poorly tracked by the anticommandeering doctrines set 
forth in New York and further developed by Printz. The critique 
of New York and Printz advanced here is an internal critique, which 
assumes without endorsing the basic normative presuppositions 
upon which those cases rest.28 
What, then, are the presuppositions of the Court's federalism 
cases and, more generally, of constitutional federalism? To begin, 
14 For discussion of the values that constirutional federalism, and federalism doctrine, 
arguably serve, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn L Rev 317, 386-405 
(1997); jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at 2213-28 (cited in note I); Deborah Jones Merritt, Tbe 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: FederaliJ?n jo1· a Tbird Ctmtmy, 88 Colum L Rev I, 
3-10 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, Fedemlism: Evaluati11g tbe Fou11ders' Design, 54 U 
Chi L Rev 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Andrzej Rapaczynski, F1"0m Sovereignty to Process: Tbe 
]zwispntdence of Federalism afte·r Garcia, 1985 Supreme Coun Review 341, 380-414; David 
L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 75-106 (Northwestern U .Press, 1995). A critical survey 
is provided by Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feele)•, Fedemlism: Srrme Notes on tl National 
N1!11rosis, 41 UCLA L Rev 903 (1994). 
IS 514 US 549 (1995). 
16 51 7 us 44 (1996). 
17 117 S Ct 2157 (1997). 
18 For an cxrernal critique, see Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 903- 52. 
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federalism might be justified in light of the geographic diversity 
of one or more variable v; to which policy is appropriately respon-
sive:29 the geographic diversity of citizen preferences, needs, or in-
terests; or, alternatively, of physical, social, or economic condi-
tions; or even, perhaps, of the ethical norms and goals that 
undergird governmental policy. The simplest, static version of the 
argument says this: the values of some v; are in fact different in 
different geographic regions; these variations are significant, that 
is, large enough to make different policies optimal for different 
regions; therefore a governmental regime that permits policy to 
vary by region, rather than requiring a single national policy, is 
optimal. As the Court crisply stated in Gregory v Ashcroft, federal-
ism "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensi-
tive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society." 30 The geo-
graphic diversity argument can also be put, more elaborately, in 
dynamic rather than static form: if separate governments defined 
by geographic region exist, then citizens will migrate to different 
regions depending on, say, their needs, interests, or ethical views, 
such that over time geographic regions characterized by different 
values of some v; will emerge. The dynamic version of the geo-
graphic diversity argument is, in effect, the argument famously ad-
vanced some forty years ago by Charles Tiebout, and since devel-
oped at great length in the economics literature on federalism.31 
A different argument for federalism stresses governmental inno-
vation rather than geographic diversity.32 As with the diversity ar-
gument, the innovation argument can be formulated either stati-
cally or dynamically. The static formulation is that proposed by 
Justice Brandeis in his oft-quoted dissent to New State Ice Co. v 
Liebmann: "To stay experimentation in things social and economic 
is a grave responsibility . . . . It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
29 See, for example, Friedman, 82 Mi1m L Rev at 401-02; Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 
8-9; McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1493-94. 
30 501 US at 458. 
31 See Charles M. Tic bout, A Pm·e Tbeory of Local Expmditum, 64 J Pol Econ 416 (1956); 
Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 918 n 62 (citing literature). 
l2 See, for example, Asbcroft, 501 US at 458; Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 397-400; 
Merritt, 88 Col urn L Rev at 9; McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1498-99; Shapiro, Federalism 
at 138- 39. 
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experiments without risk to the rest of the country."33 The notion 
here is that the efficacy of novel governmental policies is uncertain, 
and thus that, quite apart from the geographic diversity of needs, 
interests, and so on, it makes sense to create a mechanism by which 
to test novel policies on a subnational scale. That way, policy test-
ing occurs more quickly, and the harmful effects of poor policies 
are confined to particular regions rather than spread nationwide. 
One objection here is that state governments have an incentive 
to underinvest in policy innovation, as compared with the federal 
government, since each state realizes within its boundaries only a 
portion of the benefits from successful innovation, but bears all 
the costs of failure. 34 A partial response to this objection holds that 
successful states will induce immigration (with concomitant bene-
fits, such as tax dollars) by the residents or firms of less successful 
states. Thus is delineated a dynamic version of the innovation argu-
ment for federalism which, like the different kind of dynamic argu-
ment proposed by Tie bout, has been popular among economists.35 
Yet a third value arguably served by federalism is one that might 
be termed "tyranny prevention."36 It is this value that has figured 
most prominently in the recent case law. As the majority in New 
York explained: 
[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals. State sover-
eignty is not just an end in itself. Rather, federalism secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power. just as the separation and independence of the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.37 
ll 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting). 
H See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taki11g a11d Reelection: Does Federalism Promote l11710Va-
tio71? 9 J Lej,'111 Stud 593 (1980) (questioning, on various grounds, incentive of states to 
innovate). 
11 See Rubin and Feeley, 41 UCLA L Rev at 920-21 nn 68-69 (citing sources for and 
against the thesis that interstate competition is beneficial). 
10 Rapaczinski argues at length that federalism serves a "tyranny prevention" function. 
See 1985 Supreme Court Review at 380-95. For other scholarly accounts that, in name 
or substance, defend a ryranny-prevention view, see Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 402-04; 
Jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at 22 18-20; Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 3-7; McConnell, 54 
U Chi L Rev at 1500-07. 
11 505 US at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Printz heartily seconded this line of argument: "This separation 
of the two spheres [state and federal] is one of the Constitution's 
strucrural protections of liberty."38 The claim, very roughly, is that 
the amount of tyranny in a unitary regime (that is, the total tyr-
anny at the level of the national government) is greater than the 
amount of tyranny in a federal regime (that is, the total tyranny 
at the level of the national government plus the total tyranny at 
the level of the state governments). Place to one side, for the mo-
ment, the interesting problem of how to make commensurate dif-
ferent kinds of tyranny, or tyranny at different levels of govern-
ment. (For example, if the move from a unitary regime to a federal 
regime weakens the hold of powerful interest groups on the na-
tional government, but creates compact states, each with its gov-
ernment dominated by a homogenous majority of in-state citizens, 
has overall tyranny decreased or increased?) The more basic ques-
tion is what one means by "tyranny." Broadly speaking, we sug-
gest, "tyranny" can be understood as the unjustified responsiveness 
of governmental policies, or actions, or decisions, to particular 
groups or persons.39 
There are plausible arguments that constitutional federal ism 
helps to mitigate tyranny so defined. In particular, we will take as 
true the claim that constitutional federalism serves to reduce the 
interest-group dominance that would obtain in a unitary regime, 
because the collective-action problems that hinder political activity 
18 117 S Cr nt 2378. 
19 A narrower definition of tyranny would require unjustified governmental responsiveness 
to governancntal officials. Classically, of course, the "tyrant" was someone who held formal 
office-indeed, was the head of state-rather than simply being a powerful person. But 
the narrow~r definition entai ls that talk of the "tyranny of the majority," or of "interest 
group tyranny," is confu_sed. We see no confusion here. These kinds of governmental pa-
thologies, like classic tyranny, or "legislative tyranny" (the responsiveness of government 
to the interests of lebrislators, such as their interest in entrenching themselves in office), or 
"bureaucratic tyranny," are all instances of the same general phenomenon, namely, the 
unwarranted control of government by powerful groups or individuals- whether those per-
sons hold formal office or not. 
Tyranny is, at a minimum, unjustified responsiveness to particular groups or persons, 
not mere responsiveness; if, for example, it tru ly is the case that governments justifiably 
give greater weight to the inte rests of citizens as opposed to noncitizens, that hardly counts 
as "tyranny." We will not pursue the issue whctber further qualifiers are needed, e.g., 
"oppressive" or "liberty-infringing" unjustified responsiveness, because we tlo not think it 
plausible that such qualifiers materially change our argument. See, for example, Part II .C. 
(considering whether tyranny, as here defined, is more problematic when it ensues in gov-
ermnenral action rather than inaction). 
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by diffuse, unorganized groups at the national level are less difficult 
to overcome in the smaller world of state politics.40 We will also 
accept, for purposes of our internal critique, the standard view that 
constitutional federalism undermines tyranny in the narrower and 
more traditional sense of "tyranny by national officials," whether 
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, or the President.41 We do find it 
quite implausible that constitutional federalism reduces tyranny 
along all dimensions. For example, the claim that (1) the national 
government is more likely than state governments to be dominated 
by a majority of the citizenry, to the detriment of the minority, 
is in obvious tension with the claim that (2) the national govern-
ment is more likely than state governments to be dominated by 
well-organized interest groups, to the detriment of the majority. 
This returns us to the problem, alluded to above, of how to make 
commensurate different kinds of tyranny. Rather than take a stance 
on that problem, we will generally advance a critique of Printz and 
New York that is robust across different methods of commensura-
tion, and across the different types of tyranny (interest-group tyr-
anny, official tyranny, and others) that constitutional federalism 
might possibly mitigateY 
The final value arguably served by constitutional federalism is 
one that we shall term "political community."43 It is a shibboleth 
of the literature endorsing federalism that states facilitate a kind 
or degree of political participation by citizens that does not occur 
at the national level.44 We will assume that (a) democratic politics 
(including citizen involvement) has intrinsic value or importance,45 
and (b) the realm of state politics, if and only if adequately pro-
tected by the right sort of constitutionalized federalism guarantees, 
<m See Rapaczynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 386-88. 
41 See id at 388-91. 
41 But see Part Ill. C. 
41 T he Court did not rely upon the value of political community in Primz and New York, 
but it did do so in another case that figures importantly in current federalism jurisprudence, 
Gngmy v Asho·oft. See Ashcroft, 501 US at 460-64. 
44 See, for example, Friedman, 82 Minn L Rev at 389-94; Jackson, Ill Harv L Rev at 
2221; Merritt, 88 Col urn L Rev at 7 -8; McCoMell, 54 U Chi L Rev at J 507 -I I; Rapac-tyn-
ski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 395-408; Shapiro, Federalism at J 39; S. Candice Hoke, 
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 BU L Rev 685, 701-14 (1991). 
45 See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administ.-ative State: Beyond the Counter-
nrajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U PaL Rev 759, 796- 806 (1997) (elahorating this idea). 
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can realize this intrinsic value in a manner, or to a degree, that a 
unitary regime cannot.46 
II. PREEMPTION VERSUS COMMANDEERING: THE BACKGROUND 
DEMARCATION 
Printz and New York clearly adopt three lines of demarca-
tion: (1) between coercive directives to state officials, on the one 
hand, and "cooperative federalism" statutes (conditional spending 
or preemption) on the other; (2) between coercive directives to 
state officials exercising a legislative or executive function, and co-
ercive directives to state officials exercising a judicial function; and 
(3) between targeted coercive directives to state legislators or exec-
utives, and coercive directives that are generally applicable both to 
state officials and to private persons. In addition, the Supreme 
Court, in cases prior to New York and Printz, as well as in the 
Yeskey decision, has articulated a fourth demarcation line: (4) be-
tween coercive directives to state officials that are promulgated by 
Congress pursuant to its ordinary Article I powers, and coercive 
directives promulgated pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the parallel enforcement provisions in the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.47 
Do these four demarcations together define the Court's new 
state sovereignty jurisprudence? We think not. The four lines of 
demarcation just described are, we believe, overlaid upon a fifth 
and much more basic one: the demarcation between preemption and 
commandeering. Printz and New York barely recognize this point. 
Nonetheless, we shall now claim, those decisions are best inter-
preted, in the context of wider case law, as standing for the propo-
sition that the federal government may impose certain duties on 
state officials, even though the officials are nonjudicial, even 
though the duties are coercive and targeted in the strongest sense, 
-14The first assumption, (a), makes the concept of "political community" stronger than 
and distinct from the weaker view that democratic politics has merely instrumental impor-
tance in increasing the quality of governmental outc()mes. We take it that the proponentS 
of "political community" mean to endorse the stronger view. Indeed, if state politics is 
construed to have merely weak, instrumental si!,''nificance, then the line between the politi-
cal-community value of federalism and the others discussed above, particularly tyranny pre-
vention, becomes quite blurred. Presumably, the main instrumental (outcome-enhancing) 
as opposed to intrinsic role of democratic involvement is to reduce certain kinds of tyranny: 
interest-group dominance as well as official entrenchment. 
47 See PartS ill, IV (discussing these four demarcations). 
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and even though federal action is grounded merely upon the Com-
merce Clause or another Article I power rather than upon the Re-
construction Amendments. 48 
In this Part, we defend this interpretive claim. Then we discuss 
how the preemption/ commandeering distinction should be fleshed 
out. Our suggestion will be that the distinction is most plausibly 
and sympathetically construed as a distinction between inaction 
and action-between the negative duties that (albeit targeted, co-
ercive, and directed to nonjudicial officials) are a permissible ac-
companiment of the federal power to preempt, and the affirmative 
duties that are not. Finally, we argue that the preemption/com-
mandeering distinction, even when construed in this plausible and 
sympathetic way, is not strongly justified by the values of constitu-
tional federalism. 
A. IS THERE A PREEMPTION/COMMANDEERING DISTINCTION? 
The federal government, where acting within the scope of its 
authority under the Commerce Clause and the other powers set 
forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, has the power to 
define the legal positions of private parties: to accord private par-
ties federal rights, duties, liberties, powers, liabilities, and other 
legal positions, and to nullifY the state-law rights, duties, etc. that 
physically or logically conflict49 with the federal positions.50 As the 
Court has explained: 
43 For a dramatic, recent failure to understand this point, see C(J11don v Reno, 155 F3d 
453 (4th Cir 1998), where the Court invalidated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act-which 
merely required state motor vehicle departments to refrain from disclosing information in 
motor vehicle records-on the grounds that the Act was neither generally applicable nor 
an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power and was therefore unconstitutional under New 
York and Printz. By contrast, the courts in Oklnhomo v United Stntes, 161 F3d 1266 (lOth 
Cir 1998) and Travis v Reno, 163 F3d 1000 (7th Cir !998) upheld the Act against the claim 
th.at it impermissibly commandeered state governments. 
49 "Physical conflict" is meant to cover the case where it is physically impossible for 
persons to comply with both federal- and state-law positions, e.g., where federal law imposes 
a duty to perform action A and state law imposes a duty to refrain from action A. "Logical 
conflict" is meant to cover the case where having the federal position entails- as a matter 
of the logic of Hohfeldian positions-that the person nor have the state law position, e.g., 
where federal law grants a liberty to perform A , and state law imposes a duty to refrain 
from A. Stephen Gardbaum, in a recent, revisionary piece on preemption, agrees that the 
federal government has the power to override state law in both cases of conflict, but would 
(in effect) place the case of physical conflict under the Supremacy Clause and the case of 
logical conflict under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See The N11ture of Preemption, 79 
Cornell L Rev 767 (1994). 
so More precisely, it is unquestioned that the federal government has the power to define 
the federal positions of private persons, and to preempt conflicting state-law positions, just 
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A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to · 
displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity af-
fecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with fed-
eral law. Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause em-
powers Congress to prohibit all-and not just inconsistent-
state regulation of such activities. Although such congressionaJ 
enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States' preroga-
tives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States 
may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no 
other result. 51 
These propositions are explicitly endorsed by Printz and New Yo·rk, 
and understandably so/1 to deny them would be to eviscerate the 
Supremacy Clause and two centuries of precedents. 
Note, however, that the unquestioned power of the federal gov-
ernment to define the legal positions of private parties, and to pre-
empt conflicting state-law positions, does not entail a federal 
power to define or change the legal positions (particularly the leg~! 
duties) of state legislators and enforcement officials. In theory, it 
is possible to imagine a regime of constitutional federalism in 
which the federal government has the power under the Commerce 
Clause (1) to define the legal positions of private parties, and (2) 
to impose a duty upon federal officials to respect, support, or en-
force the rights, duties, etc. of private parties, as defined by the 
federal government, and also (3) to impose a duty upon state 
judges and adjudicators to respect, support, or enforce the rights, 
duties, etc. of private parties, as defined by the federal government, 
insofar as the federal positions of private persons do not entail duties by state officials. 
Obviously, it is not unquestioned that the federal government can give private persons a 
claim-right against smte officials. 
II Hodel v v;rginia Smface Mining & Rec/amatio11 1/ss'n, inc., 452 us 264, 290 (1981) (cita-
tions omitted). 
12 See New York, 505 US at 178 ("The Constitution ... gives Congrc:ss the authority to 
regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation"); Printz, I I 7 S Ct at 
2374 (stating that "all state actions [obstructing federal law) are ipso ft1cto invalid" and citing 
Silkwood v Km·-McGee Corp., 464 US 238 (1984), for the proposition that federal law pre-
empt.~ conAicting state law). Sec also PERC v Mississippi, 456 US 742, 766-67 (1982) (stress-
ing federal power to define legal positions of priv~te persons, and to preempt conAicting 
state law); N11tiona/ League of Cites v Usery, 426 US 833, 840-45 (I 976) (same, but also 
distint,ruishing between federal power over private persons and federal power over states 
them~elves), overruled, Gtmia v Sa11 Amonio Met:ropolitan Tmnsit Auth., 469 US 528 (1985); 
Fry v United St11tes, 421 US 542, 552 (1975) (Rehnquist dissenting) ("Congress may pre-
empt state regulatory authority in areas where both bodies are otherwise competent to act. 
But this well-recognized principle of tbe Supremacy Clause is traditionally associated with 
federal rct,rulation of persons or enterprises, rather than with federal ret,rulation of the State 
itself . ... "). 
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but not the power to impose any duty at all53 upon nonjudicial state 
officials. That is, it is in theory possible to imagine a constitutional 
regime in which, notwithstanding the federal power to define the 
legal position of private parties, state legislators and enforcement 
officials would remain free to act as if federal statutes had not been 
enacted, and the only governmental officials who would incur du-
ties in virtue of a federal statute (under the Commerce Clause) 
would be federal officials and state judges and adjudicators. Indeed, 
a regime of constitutional federalism without federal power to im-
pose duties upon state officials is precisely what an earlier Supreme 
Court endorsed in an 1861 decision, Kentucky v Dennison.54 As the 
Dennison Court put it: "[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Gov-
ernment, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a 
State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it." 55 
Should Printz and New York be read as reintroducing the Den-
nison doctrine into constitutional jurisprudence-more specifically, 
as reintroducing Dennison with respect to targeted federal statutes 
that are addressed to nonjudicial state officials, and that are 
grounded upon the Commerce Clause or Congress's other Article 
I powers? We think not. Note, to begin, that the Court, in PERC 
v Mississippi-a state sovereignty case preceding Printz and New 
York-specifically disavowed Dennison as "not representative of the 
law today," and stated that the federal power to define the legal 
positions of private parties encompassed an ancillary power to im-
pose some duties upon (nonjudicial as well as judicial) state offi-
cials: "[s]tate legislative [as well as] judicial decisionmakers must 
give preclusive effect to federal enactments concerning nongovern-
mental activity."56 More important, to read Printz and New York 
as denying federal power to impose any targeted, coercive duties 
on nonjudicial state officials would be to read them as undermining 
the large and long-standing body of preemption case law in which, 
time and again, the Court has either explicitly authorized or at 
least not questioned the entry of declaratory or injunctive relief 
against state enforcement officials, prohibiting the officials from 
Sl By "duty," here, we mean a lef:,ral, sanction-backed duty. 
54 65 US 66 (186 1), overruled, Pumo Rico v Bmnstnd, 483 US 219 (1987). 
lS 65 US at 107. 
56 456 US at 761, 766. 
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enforcing preempted state laws (specifically, state laws preempted 
by federal law that is grounded in the Commerce Clause or an-
other Article I power, and not in the Reconstruction Amend-
ments), under threat of civil or criminal contempt. (Such a duty 
of nonenforcement is clearly targeted; only state officials, not the 
population at large, have the power to enforce state law. 57) To give 
but one example, in Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc., with Jus-
tice Scalia (the author of Printz) writing for the majority, the Su-
preme Court held that state guidelines governing airline fare ad-
vertising were preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act, 
and sustained the district court's entry of that portion of a perma-
nent injunction against the Attorney General of Texas which 
obliged him not to enforce the preempted guidelines against the 
airlines.58 The Court in Printz and New York surely did not intend 
to call into question Morales and the numerous other cases like it.59 
Indeed, a brief passage in Printz seemingly acknowledges that 
the federal government, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, does 
have the power to impose targeted legal duties on state legislators 
and enforcement officials, not merely state adjudicators. This ac-
knowledgment comes in the course of the Court's discussion of a 
passage from Federalist 27. 
These problems (in Justice Souter's interpretation of the pas-
sage] are avoided, of course, if [the passage is] taken to refer 
to nothing more (or less) than the duty owed to the National 
Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, 
57 More precisely, only stare officials typically have the power to enforce state law in the 
sense of bringing civil or criminal enforcement actions, or undertaking investigatory activi -
ties, in the name of the state. And in the cases referred to here, it is typically state officials 
alone who arc made subject to the declaration or injunction enjoining enforcement. Sec 
also South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514 (1988) (suggesting that federa l statute which 
"seek[s] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parries" is not 
"generally applicable") (internal quotation omitted). 
18 504 US 3 74 (1992); see id at 380-82 (explicitly authorizing injunctive relief under Ex 
parte Youug, 209 US 123 (1908)). for similar cases, sec, for example, Barnett Bank v Nelson, 
517 US 25 (1996); Livadasv Bradsbaw, 512 US 107 (1994); Gade v Nat'/ Solid Wastes Manage-
mem Ass'n, 505 US 88 (1992); Schneidewind v ANR Pipeline Co., 485 US 293 (1988); Capital 
Cities Cable, /uc. v Crisp, 467 US 691 (1984); Shaw v Delta Air Lines, h1c., 463 US 85 ( 1983); 
New Mexico v Mesrnlt7'0 Apacbe T1·ibe, 462 US 324 (1983); Washington v Washiugtou State 
Conrmercial Passenge1· Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 44 3 US 658 (1979); Douglas v Seacoast P1'0ducts, 
Inc., 431 US 265 (1977); Ray v Atlantic Ricbfield Co., 435 US !5 1 (1978);Joues v Roth Packiug 
Co., 430 US 519 (1977); City of Burbank v Lockbeed Ai1· Terminal Inc., 411 US 624 (1973). 
s• Surely, too, the Court did not intend to overrule the line of cases authorizing suit 
under Section 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights. See Maine v Tbiboutot, 448 US I 
(1980); Goldn1 State Transit Corp. v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989). 
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and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the 
operation of federal law, and the attendant reality that all state 
actions constituting such obstruction, even legislative acts, are 
ipso facto invalid.60 
87 
This passage is hardly crystalline. But, interpreted in the context of 
Morales and the preemption decisions that Morales epitomizes, the 
passage should be understood to confinn the existence of a demar-
cation additional to those explicitly set forth by Printz and New York: 
the demarcation between preemption and commandeering. 
The question remains whether Congress has the power to im-
pose targeted duties on nonjudicial state officials directly, or 
whether instead it must always do so indirectly, via the federal 
courts. On the "indirect" view, Congress can pass a statute chang-
ing the legal position of private parties, but until a federal court 
imposes concomitant duties on state officials through some kind 
of judicial directive, those officials remain free to act as if the fed-
eral statute had never been enacted. Surprising as this view might 
seem, there is real textual support for it in a passage from the New 
York opinion: 
Additional cases cited by the United States [to demonstrate 
the federal power to issue directives to state governments] dis-
cuss the power of federal courts to order state officials to comply 
with federal law. Again, however, the text of the Constitution 
plainly confers this authority on the federal courts, the "judicial 
Power" of which "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution .... " The Constitution contains 
no analogous grant of authority to Congress. Moreover, the 
Supremacy C lause makes federal law paramount over the con-
trary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to 
enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority to order 
state officials to comply. 
In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only 
that federal law is enforceable in state courts and that federal 
courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to com-
ply with federal law, propositions that by no means imply any 
authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation.61 
60 11 7 S Ct at 2374. The language from Ntw York discussed immediately below, see 505 
US at 179, also constitutes a recognition by the Court that at least some federal governmen-
ta l entities-namely, the federal courts-can impose certain duties upon nonjudicial state 
officials. 
61 505 US at 179 (citations omitted). This language, in tum, seems to trace back to justice 
O'Connor's opinion in FERC v Missimppi. See 456 US at 784 n 13 (O'Connor concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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What is striking here is both the Court's distinction between judi-
cial and nonjudicial federal directives, and its failure to describe 
any category of directives that federal bodies other than the federal 
courts can issue to state (legislative and executive) officials. One 
of the Court's tasks in future federalism cases will be to provide 
a definitive gloss on this language from New Y01··k, and a definitive 
answer to the problem of direct versus indirect duties. 
Our own conclusion is that Printz and New York, together with 
other existing lines of federalism cases, are best interpreted as re-
jecting the indirect view. Congress can, we think, directly issue 
preemption commands to state legislators or executives and back 
up such commands with the threat of civil or criminal sanction, 
quite apart from the power of the federal courts (acknowledged in 
New York) to do so. Consider the substantial body of federal crimi-
nal law applicable to state officials, and the multiple Supreme 
Court cases upholding the prosecution and conviction of state of-
ficials pursuant to these statutes.62 The indirect view would eviscer-
ate or at least gravely disrupt this jurisprudence. Or consider the 
well-established doctrine that, where a preempted state law has 
wrongly been enforced by the state, injured parties may sue for 
damages under Section 1983.63 The indirect view would require 
that state officials or state subdivisions never be made defendant 
to such suits, at least prior to a judicial injunction, declaration, or 
other directive against them.64 
In sum, New York and Printz are best interpreted, in the wider 
context of relevant case law, to mean the following: Congress can-
61 A recent example is Salinas v United States, 118 S Ct 469 (1997). As the Court has 
explained: "IT]he cases in this Court which have recognized an immunity from civil suit 
for state officials have presumed the existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining 
factor on the conduct of state officials." United Swtes v Gillock, 445 US 360, 3 72 (1980). 
61 See Golden St11te Tmnsit Corp. v City of Los Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989). 
M A further, significant piece of evidence is the Court's opinion in p,.intz itself, which 
fails to mention NI!W Y01·k's distinction hetween federal judicial and non-judicial directives. 
Finally, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the indirect view seems tenuous. The 
power to issue a sanction-backed directive is hardly a uniquely judicial power, at least where 
the directive is issued to a class of persons ("all state law enforcement officers," etc.), rather 
than a named individual. The Court's reasoning in the passage from NI!W Yo,.k implies the 
conclusion that a federal stature that is addressed to private persons, and that other.visc 
lies within Congress's Article T powers, cannot be accompanied by a penalty provision 
threatening chose persons with sanction for noncompliance. But since this conclusion is 
clearly wrong-since, in truth, there is nothing uniquely judicial about the "authority to 
order [persons) to comply" with federal law- then there is no Article In basis for reserving 
to the federal courts che unique power to direct compliance by state officials. 
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not commandeer either state legislators or state executive officials, 
but it can directly impose some targeted, coercive duties on state 
executive officials and state legislators6s pursuant to its power to 
define the legal positions of private persons. This leads us to the 
next question: What kind of targeted, coercive duties for state of-
ficials are permissible under New York and Printz, and what kind 
constitute impermissible commandeering? 
B. NEGATIVE VERSUS AFFIRMATIVE OUTU:S 
Existing scholarship on Printz and New York has tended to as-
sume, without much discussion, the proposition for which we have 
just argued at some length: that the federal power of preemption 
includes a power to impose certain duties on state officials. More-
over, existing scholarship bas tended to assume, without argument, 
the separate proposition that the category of permissible duties are 
negative duties, duties of inaction, as opposed to positive duties, 
duties of action.66 Notably, however, the Court in Printz and New 
York does not articulate an action/inaction distinction-not sur-
prisingly, given the Court's failure to confirm, with any clarity, the 
more basic and logically prior demarcation between comman-
deering and preemption. We agree with other scholars that the 
commandeering/preemption distinction is most plausibly and sym-
pathetically fleshed out in terms of (some version of) the action/ 
inaction distinction. But a fa ir bit of conceptual, interpretive, and 
normative work is required to accomplish the mapping from pre-
emption onto negative duties, and from commandeering onto af-
firmative ones. 
Let us begin with a paradigm. Paradigmatically, Congress may 
61 Although the Court in Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367 (1951), and irs sequelae, see 
Bogan v Scott-Harris, 118 S Ct 966 (1998); Supmne Court of Va. v Co11smners Union, 446 
US 719 (1980); Lolce Co1mtry &totes, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Pla1111ing Agency, 440 US 391 
(1979), has repeatedly held that state legislators arc absolutely immune from suit under 
Section 1983, we take it that this immunity is statutory, not constitutional. Congress can, 
under the rubric of preemption, impose duties upon state legislators as well as executive 
officials. Sec United States v Gillock, 445 US 360 (1980) (finding no state legislative immunity 
in federal criminal prosecution). Notably, the Court in Primz tOok great pains to deny the 
import of the legislator/executive distinction, see 117 S Ct at 2380-81, and nowhere sug-
gested that the scope of duties constitutionally imposablc upon state executives was wider 
than that imposablc upon legislators. 
66 Sec jackson, Il l Harv L Rev at 2201-02; Ilills, 96 MichL Rev at 870-71; Caminker, 
1997 Supreme Court Review at 235-36 (all ci ted in note 1). 
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oblige state executive officers not to enforce a statute or regulation 
that creates duties for private persons-this is what is at stake in 
garden-variety preemption cases-and, we take it, Congress also 
has the constitutional power to require state legislators (or state 
agency officials with rule-making power) not to enact a state stat-
ute or regulation that creates duties for private persons.67 For 
short, we'll call this the "Preemption Paradigm." Conversely, the 
federalism doctrine set forth in Printz and New York prohibits 
Congress from.obliging state officials to enact or enforce a statute 
or regulation that creates duties for private persons. As the Court 
explained, in the concluding paragraph of the Printz opinion: 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today 
we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by 
conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Govern-
ment may neither issue directives requiring the States to ad-
dress particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or 
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program.68 
For short, we'll call this paradigmatic case of impermissible federal 
duties the "Commandeering Paradigm." What is the distinction 
between the duties imposed upon state officers in the Preemption 
Paradigm, and the duties imposed upon them in the Comman-
deering Paradigm? 
Some apparent distinctions either are implausible or fail to sort 
between the two paradigms at all. For example, although Printz 
and New York repeatedly state that Congress may not "compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program," or words 
to that effect,69 there surely can be federal statutes that do not 
literally do that-that do not require state officers to enact or en-
force duties for private persons-but nonetheless constitute imper-
missible commandeering. Imagine a federal statute (backed by the 
67 See note 65 (discussing legislative immunity). 
611 117 S Ct at 2384. 
69 See, for example, Printz, 117 S Ct at 2369 ("the Brndy Act purports to direct state law 
enforcemem officers to participate ... in the administration of a federally enacted re1,rulatory 
scheme"); id at 2380 ("[New Yo·rk involved] a federnl statute that ... required the States 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program''); id at 2383 (" ' [t]he Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program' ") 
(quoting New York, 505 US at 188). 
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threat of sanctions for noncomplying states or state officials) that 
unconditionally requires the state to enact and administer an enti-
tlement program, rather than a program of regulation. We doubt 
that the Court would uphold a federally required entitlement pro-
gram of this kind. There is no connection, even an apparent or 
intuitive one, between federalism values and the regulation/ enti-
tlement distinction.70 
A second distinction between the Preemption Paradigm and the 
Commandeering Paradigm that can quickly be rejected is the dis-
tinction between federal duties that negatively affect the level of 
state resources and those that do not.1 1 For this distinction fails 
even to observe the boundaries between the two paradigms. Some 
cases that fall within the Commandeering Paradigm will have very 
little resource impact, if any, upon the state-consider a federal 
requirement that the state legislature simply enact a particular 
duty-creating law, with this law to be implemented by private suit 
rather than official prosecution. Conversely, cases that fall within 
the Preemption Paradigm-most obviously, the federal preemp-
tion of state taxes72-can diminish state resources considerably. 
A third unworkable distinction between the Commandeering 
Paradigm and the Preemption Paradigm is the distinction between 
a federal requirement that obliges the state to depart from the sta-
tus quo, and a federal requirement that does not. The problem 
here is defining the state of affairs that constitutes "the status quo" 
in a way that is noncircular and nonarbitrary and yet observes the 
boundary between the two paradigms.73 Why not say that the state 
of affairs in which the state enacts and enforces a regulatory pro-
gram is the status quo, and thus that the Commandeering Para-
digm requires no state departure from this baseline? Clearly, to 
say that the status quo cannot involve federal commandeering 
70 See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2370-71 (distinguishing early federal statute that required state 
courts to record applications for citizenship, and similar statutes, with reference to judicial/ 
nonjudicial demarcation, not by exempting entitlement commandeering from scope of anti-
commandeering rule). 
71 See National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US at 846 (relying, in part, on substantial costs 
imposed by Fair Labor Standards Act upon states and subdivisions to justify invalidating the 
statute), overruled, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Auth. , 469 US 528 (1985). 
11 See, for example, Aloha Airlines, Inc. v Director of Taxation, 464 US 7 (1983). 
11 For a discussion of various possible definitions of the status quo baseline, see Seth F. 
Kreimer, A/Jocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa 
L Rev 1293, 1351-74 (1984). 
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would be viciously circular; we are here trying to define comman-
deering by reference to the status quo. AJternately and noncircu-
larly, one might define the status quo as (a) the state of affairs that 
would have ensued, absent federal intervention, or (b) the state of 
affairs that the federal government is authorized to effect or aim 
at, consistent with its constitutional powers (and with individual 
rights), apart from the anticommandeering doctrine. But using 
baseline (a) means that only a subset of otherwise-constitutional 
commandeerings covered by the Commandeering Paradigm-the 
subset where the commandeered regulatory program is one that 
the state itself would not have enacted, absent federal interven-
tion-are unconstitutional. And using baseline (b) means that no 
otherwise-constitutional commandeerings covered by the Com-
mandeering Paradigm are unconstitutional (in short, that the 
anticommandeering doctrine does no constitutional work at all). 
This leads us, finally, to the action/inaction distinction. At the 
outset, we stress that the distinction is a contested one. What, pre-
cisely, makes some person's (or some official's) behavior an "ac-
tion," as opposed to a mere failure to act, has been and remains 
a topic of considerable controversy in the philosophical literature.74 
But there are at least some philosophically respectable versions of 
the distinction that will count the duty imposed upon state officials 
in the Commandeering Paradigm as an affirmative duty- a duty 
of action-and the duty imposed in the Preemption Paradigm as 
a merely negative duty of inaction. For example, one prevalent 
account construes the action/inaction distinction as a distinction 
between physical movement and immobility.75 On this account, it 
is roughly the case that P "acts" just in case she moves her body 
(P's body is voluntarily moved by P), and that otherwise there is 
inaction or failure to act by P. And, indeed, one of the differences 
between the Commandeering Paradigm and the Preemption Para-
digm is the difference between movement and immobility. The 
enactment and enforcement of a duty-creating statute does indeed 
require physical movements by state legislators and enforcement 
officers. Some state legislators must open their mouths or raise 
their hands to vote "yea" for the statute; and state enforcement 
14 See generally Jonathan Bennett, Tbe Act Itself (Clarendon, 1995). 
15 See, for example, Michael S. Moore, Act and Cii111e: Tbe Pbi/osopby of Action and Its 
lmplicatioiU /01' c,·iminal Law (Clarendon, 1993). 
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officers must raise their pens, or touch their fingers to computer 
keyboards, so as to issue arrest warrants, subpoenas, indictments, 
and so on. By contrast, state officials can not-enact or not-enforce 
a duty-creating statute by remaining entirely immobile. Note fur-
ther that the movement/immobili ty distinction correctly catego-
rizes the case of a federally required entitlement program as a case 
of commandeering-at least where the entitlement (say, an entitle-
ment to state monies) would not exist absent the enactment of a 
statute or other positive law by the state, since once again the en-
actment of positive law requires physical movements by the 
enactors. 
So the action/inaction distinction (at least certain versions of it) 
can do the conceptual work of sorting between the Comman-
deering Paradigm and the Preemption Paradigm. Further, the con-
ceptual mapping from preemption onto inaction, and comman-
deering onto action, has some interpretive plausibility, given the 
role that the action/inaction distinction has played in other parts 
of the Court's jurisprudence-specifically, in defining the content 
of constitutional rights. For example, in the DeShaney case, where 
it denied a due process claim brought by an abused child whom 
governmental social workers had failed to protect, the Court quite 
clearly and definitively stated that the Due Process Clause gener-
ally imposes only negative duties on government officials, not af-
firmative duties.76 There are also some textual hints in the state 
sovereignty jurisprudence itself (although not much more than 
that) that the preemption versus commandeering distinction does 
indeed map onto inaction versus action.77 
Finally, we suggest that there is a plausible or apparent link be-
tween the action/inaction distinction, and at least some of the nor-
mative considerations undergirding constitutional federalism. Two 
of the federalism values we described in Part 1-the value of tyr-
anny prevention, and the value of political community-seem to 
implicate, or plausibly implicate, the distinction. As for tyranny 
prevention: just as there is considerable philosophical support for 
the "deontological" view that the action/inaction distinction has 
16 DeShnnty v Winnebago Co1mty Dept. of S«inl Services, 489 US 189, 195-97 (1989). 
17 See FERC v MiSiissippi, 456 US at 762 -63 n 27, 765, 767-68 n 30 (noting pennissibility 
of even certain "affirmative" federal obligations for stare officials); Printz, 117 S Ct at 23 74 
(noting obligation of state officials "not ro obstruct" the operation of federal law). 
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general moral significance/8 so it seems plausible that governmen-
tal action is worse than governmental inaction, and specifically that 
tyrannical governmental action is worse than tyrannical govern-
mental inaction. Indeed, this apparent link between action/inac-
tion and the value of tyranny prevention underlies the Court's rea-
soning in De Shaney. 
As for the value of political community, it seems plausible that 
federal statutes compelling a particular subcategory of state ac-
tion-a subcategory we shall call "authoritative utterances" -do 
indeed infringe upon the state's functioning as a political commu-
nity in a distinctive and emphatic way. By "authoritative utter-
ance," we mean a law-producing action: an action by a state official 
that is an instance of some legal power of hers to define legal 
rights, duties, and other legal positions.19 Classic authoritative ut-
terances include the legislative action of enacting a statute, the ex-
ecutive action of issuing a command (e.g., an order to produce 
information, or an order placing some person under arrest), and 
the judicial action of imposing a sanction upon, or issuing an in-
junction to, a particular person. 
A requirement that state legislators enact a particular statute 
seems, somehow, to be more of an interference with state auton-
omy than a requirement that they refrain from enacting a particu-
lar statute. For in the case of the affirmative requirement, there is 
a discrete, authoritative utterance-the enactment of the statute-
that the legislators have been compelled to produce. By contrast, 
in the case of the negative requirement, it is not (or may not be) 
true of any utterance that the legislators have produced, that it 
was thus compelled. It is not (or may not be) true of any entry in 
the set of legislative utterances (the Statutes at Large) that the legis-
lators were obliged by external, federal compulsion to produce that 
utterance. Similarly, it seems, a requirement that state executives 
78 For an overview of the debate between deomologists and consequentialists, see Shelly 
Kagan, Nomzative Ethics (\Vestview, 1998). 
79 Notably, however, the starutc invalidated in Printz did not compel authoritative uner-
ances; state officers were simply required to investigate the legality of gun sales. The " take 
title" provision invalidated in New Y01·k did not compel authoritative utterances either, at 
least insofar as that provision simply required the states to take physical possession of the 
nuclear waste; however, since such possession, or "title" apart from possession, might lead 
to judgments against the state, which the state would then be obliged to pay, "authoritative 
utterances" were arguably involved in New Yo1·k. See 505 US at 154-55, 174-77 (quoting 
and discussing "take title" provision). 
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perform an authoritative utterance, of whatever lcind, intrudes 
more sharply on political-community values than a requirement 
that they refrain from such performance. 
In short, we believe that there is a good conceptual, interpretive, 
and normative case for construing the preemption/ comman-
deering distinction as a distinction between inaction and action. If 
the Court is to craft a jurisprudence that prohibits comman-
deering, but permits the kind of federal duties for state officials 
that the preemption case law has long recognized, then it should 
define impermissible commandeering as a targeted, coercive duty 
for state legislative or executive officials that requires action on the 
part of the officials, and permissible preemption as a duty (perhaps 
targeted, perhaps coercive, and perhaps addressed to nonjudicial 
officials) that does not require official action.8° For the remainder of 
the article, both in this Part and in subsequent Parts, we use the 
commandeering/preemption distinction and the action/inaction 
distinction interchangeably. We shall now argue that the 
commandeering/preemption distinction-even cashed sympathet-
ically as action versus inaction- is not truly justified by the values 
of constitutional federalism. 
C. PREEMPTION, COMMANDEERING, AND THE VALUES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 
I t seems clear that the preemption/commandeering distinction 
has little to do with the first two federalism values we described 
in Part I: the value of responsiveness to geographic diversity, and 
the value of innovation. A federal statute requiring inaction by 
state officers (permissible preemption) can dampen interjurisdic-
tional policy variation, no less than a federal statute requiring offi-
cial action (impermissible commandeering).81 Indeed, neither in 
Printz nor in New York did the Court seek to defend the 
10 There is, however, at least one way in which a straight action/inaction distinction is 
too crude a construal of the commandeering/preemption distinction. Presumably Congress 
can impose certain affirmative remedial duties upon state officials who breach their negative 
federal duties. Some such remedial duties, albeit affirmative, will not (we assume) constitute 
commandeering. See Golden State Transit Corp. v City of Lcs Angeles, 493 US 103 (1989) 
(upholding Section 1983 damages action against city, for breach of statutory duties under 
National Labor Relations Act). Undoubtedly, further refinementS to the basic distinction 
between action and inaction will emerge if the Court explicitly adoptS that distinction and 
persistS in the anticommandeering jurisprudenc-e. 
81 See Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1078-79 (cited in note 1). 
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preemption/ commandeering distinction with reference to the val-
ues of geographic diversity and innovation. Rather, those values 
are appropriately protected (if at ail) through straight Commerce 
Clause doctrine plus the doctrines governing the scope of Con-
gress's other Article I powers. These doctrines curb national uni-
formity, and thereby protect the values of diversity and innovation, 
by limiting the power of Congress to preempt or commandeer. 
More plausibly, we have already suggested, there is a link be-
tween the preemption/commandeering distinction and the value 
of political community. In the case of federal directives compelling 
state actions-specifically, in the case of federal directives compel-
ling authoritative utterances by state officials- there is a particular 
utterance (a particular state statute, say) that the federal govern-
ment has compelled the state to perform. That surely seems worse 
for democratic self-governance than the case in which state offi-
cials merely have been compelled to refrain from certain utter-
ances. Is it truly worse? We think not, and will now argue to the 
contrary. 
The political-community defense of constitutional federalism 
rests upon the premise that it is intrinsically valuable for citizens 
to participate in governance. Democratic procedures and institu-
tions are premised to have intrinsic value, apart from their instru-
mental value in improving the quality of governmental outcomes. 
It is further claimed that a federal regime (by virtue of the smaller 
size of state governments) instantiates this intrinsic value more 
fully than a unitary regime. How does commandeering undermine 
that? Commandeering, it must be stressed, does not change the 
participatory or democratic structure of state government. Al-
though state legislators are now obliged to enact a statute, or state 
executives are now obliged to issue a directive, it remains the case 
that legislators are elected by majority vote at regular elections, 
that executives either are elected themselves or appointed by 
elected officials, and that state citizens retain whatever rights they 
otherwise would have to learn about, comment upon, criticize, and 
challenge the choices of state legislators and executives. 
Rather, commandeering undermines self-governance by limiting 
the set of options that state legislators and executives have. The 
choice whether to perform the commandeered utterance is no 
longer a choice that is open to the officials and, derivatively, the 
citizenry; it is no longer a choice that is responsive to the exercise 
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of electoral and other democratic rights by those citizens. But, of 
course, the same is true of preemption. Preemption, too, limits 
the choices of state legislators and executives, and in a precisely 
complementary way. While commandeering reduces the official's 
choice set from C0 (perform the authoritative utterance, not-per-
form the Utterance) to C1 (perform the Utterance), preemption re-
duces the choice set from C0 (perform the authoritative utterance, 
not-perform the utterance) to c2 (not-perform the utterance). In 
each case, some opportunity for state legislators, executives, and, 
derivatively, the state citizenry to shape the content of state law 
has been removed from them.82 
To put the point another way: the total corpus of state law is 
defined both by the authoritative utterances that legislators and 
executives perform, and by the utterances that legislators and exec-
utives refrain from performing. By coercing performances or re-
frainings, commandeering or preemption constrains the content of 
state law and in that way reduces the extent to which state law 
can be shaped by intrinsically valuable procedures or institutions, 
thereby undermining the value of political community. But it is 
not the case that this value is especially or asymmetrically under-
mined by commandeering. 
Why not say that affirmative shaping and negative shaping are 
differentially valuable-that the reduction of the state's choice set 
from C0 to C1 diminishes political community more than the re-
duction of the choice set from C0 to C2? We think this claim inde-
fensible. The intrinsic value of political community, such as it may 
be, inheres in responsible decision making by state citizens, and 
in associated virtues such as deliberation, dialogue, open-mind-
edness, and impartiality. Qua the opportunity for decision making, 
there is no difference between the two reductions in choice sets. 
To explain why affirmative shaping and negative shaping are dif-
ferentially valuable, one would need to appeal, not to the intrinsic 
value of decisionmaking, but to something else- say, the intrinsic 
value, for a state citizen, of identifying with the community of state 
citizens and its laws. The citizen identifies most strongly-or so 
it might be claimed- with the utterances that her legislators and 
81 Professor Caminker makes a similar point, id at 1077-78. In Pan ID.A. we qualify 
somewhat the claim that commandeering diminishes choice, but the qualification applies 
symmetrically to preemption. 
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executives have performed, not the utterances that they have re-
frained from performing. Therefore, compelled performance in-
terferes with political community more gravely than compelled re-
fraining. But even if there is something like such an identification 
value realized by political communities, apart from the value of 
responsible decision making, we do not see why citizens ought to 
identify with affirmative utterances (as opposed to the overall cor-
pus of state law), nor do we know of any empirical work to demon-
strate that they do in fact thus identify.83 
Finally, we come to the fourth value of federalism, and the one 
explicitly invoked in Printz and New York: tyranny prevention. 
Both commandeering and preemption may be tyranny-enhancing, 
along some dimensions, as compared to straight federal or state 
directives to private persons-we will not try to deny that here-
but we do deny that commandeering is especially tyranny-enhanc-
ing, as compared to preemption. 
Consider again the choice set we called C0: the choice between a 
state official's performance of an authoritative utterance (or, more 
generally, of an action) and her nonperformance of that utterance 
(or, more generally, of that action). Let us assume that federalism 
is tyranny-preventing, along a given dimension. That is, the federal 
government's resolution of C0 is more likely to be unjustifiably 
responsive to the interests of the given group (economic interest 
groups, officials of the relevant government, a homogeneous ma-
jority of the relevant citizenry) than the state's resolution of C0• 
If the federal government is permitted to decide whether the state 
official should perform the action, then-we will imagine-that 
decision is more likely to be tyrannical (in the given way) than a 
simple decision by the state official, herself, whether to perform 
the action. Why might this obtain? It might obtain because of the 
kind of "accountability" considerations adduced by the Court in 
Printz and New York. 
[VV]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, 
the accountability of both state and federal officials is dimin-
ished .... [I]t may be state officials who will bear the brunt 
SJ Indeed, we can readily imagine counterexamples to the claim that the state's authorita-
tive utterances have a greater role in characterizing the state, and in fostering identification 
(or disassociation) by state citizens, than state decisions to refrain from authoritative utter-
ances. Imagine a state that refrains from proscribing marijuana use or assisted suicide, or 
from regulating abortion. 
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of public disapproval, while the federal officiaLs who devised 
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus di-
minished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials 
cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local elec-
torate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.84 
99 
But, again, this is not an argument against commandeering, as 
such, because both commandeering and preemption shift C0 from 
the state level to the federal level. When federal officials preempt 
a state statute, they can be confident-if the accountability story 
is correct-that state rather than federal officials will be held ac-
countable for the nonenactment of the statute. Similarly, when 
federal officials commandeer a state statute, they can be confi-
dent-foUowing the same story-that state rather than federal of-
ficials will be held responsible for the enactment of the statute. 
Pace the Court's argument in New York, 85 we see no asymmetry 
here. The choice between state action and state inaction may be 
less accountable to the electorate, where that choice is directed by 
a federal statute rather than resolved by state officials themselves, 
but, if so, this is true whether the federal directive compels action 
or inaction.86 
What about the claim that tyranny is more problematic when 
state action, as opposed to inaction, ensues? The defender of the 
preemption/commandeering line might try to reformulate the 
Court's accountability argument in New York and Printz; the point, 
she might argue, is not that compelled state inaction is more likely 
to be accountable to the electorate than compelled action, but 
rather that unaccountable state inaction is simply less troubling. 
But is it really? To begin, it bears emphasis that the anticomman-
deering rule becomes nonsuperfluous just where it involves com-
mandeered state actions that do not violate constitutional rights. 
The federal statutes in Printz and New York did not coerce state 
officials to perform actions that violated the First Amendment, the 
Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection 
84 New York, 505 US at 168-69. See Printz, 117 S Ctat 2377. 
85 See 505 US at 168-69. 
86 For similar skepticism about t:he Court's accountability rationale, wit:h respect eit:her 
to preemption/commandeering or to t:he cooperative federalism demarcation, see Cam-
inker, 96 Colum L Rev at 1061-74; Hills, 96 MichL Rev at 824-30; jackson, Ill Harv 
L Rev at 2200- 05 (all cited in note 1). 
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Clause, or any other part of the Bill of Rights; if the federal stat-
utes had commandeered rights-violating state action, the Court 
would not have needed to invoke state sovereignty to justify inval-
idating those statutes. So the anticommandeering rule (in its non-
superfluous portion) involves state action that lies within the zone 
of permissible action sketched out by the Bill of Rights. 
We doubt that state action, at least state action within this zone, 
is more likely to produce significant harm to the interests or wel-
fare of the citizenry, or of some portion thereof, than state inac-
tion. To see the point, consider the harm to a person P that ensues 
when P dies. We'll assume, arguendo, that a state government (in 
some way) produces a graver harm toP's interests or welfare when 
governmental officials intentionally and directly kill P than when 
they merely fail to prevent P's death. Yet it violates the Bill of 
Rights for the state government to intentionally and directly kill 
P.87 Conversely, where the state governmental action comman-
deered by federal statute is constitutionally permissible under the 
Bill of Rights- and thus the anticommandeering rule comes into 
play-we see no reason to think that such action is worse per se 
for P than state governmental inaction. For example, state govern-
mental inaction causes P's death when government fails to regulate 
the polluters who emit carcinogens into the air that P breathes. 88 State 
governmental action causes P's death when government prohibits 
firms from selling P the medication that would cure the cancer. 
Is P's death worse for him or anyone else when Congress requires 
state governments to prohibit firms from selling P the medication 
than when Congress requires state governments to leave the car-
cinogen-emitting polluters unregulated? We think not.89 
81 More precisely, it violates the Bill of Rights for state government to intentionally, 
di rectly, and unjustifiably kill P. See Snc'l'lrmemo v Lewis, 11 8 S Ct 1708, 17 18 (1998) ("It 
is ... behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum [from negligence) that would 
most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some 
way unjustifiable by any government interest is me sort of official action most likely to rise 
to me conscience-shocking level."). The qualification for justifiable killing, here, does not 
materially change our argument. Arguably, a justifiable governmental killing of P is no 
worse for him than a governmental failure to prevent his death. And even if this is not 
true, me case of a justifiable killing is a special one; direct and intentional killings by govern-
menr will generally violate the Bill of Rights. Indeed, insofar as the proponent of Pt·intz 
and New Ym·k is focused on tyrannical governmental action- action unjustifiably responsive 
to particular groups o r persons-such action will by definition be unjustified. 
88 On inaction as causal, see Bennett, Tbe Acr Itself at 126-30 (cited in note 74). 
89 What about the claim that, in general, commandeered state action causes serious wel-
filre setbacks, like death, illness, and poverty, while commandeered state inaction will cause 
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Clearly, there are large, normative issues here that this article 
cannot hope to resolve definitively.90 Someone who believes in the 
asymmetry of governmental action and inaction is unlikely to be 
persuaded otherwise by our brief discussion. The most we can re-
ally accomplish here is to clarify the normative issues raised by the 
preemption/ commandeering distinction. We suggest that the best 
defense for that distinction rests upon the value of tyranny preven-
tion, rather than the other federalism values of diversity-respon-
siveness, innovation, and political community. So the Court in 
Printz and New York was correct to invoke d1at value, as opposed 
to these other three. But the Court went astray in suggesting that 
differential accountability could explain the distinction. Rather, the 
claim would have to be that unaccountable action and unaccount-
able inaction are differentially problematic. And we have tried to 
undermine that claim, insofar as it is relevant here. Federal com-
mandeering, insofar as it compels state actions that do not violate 
the Bill of Rights, is not more problematic, we think, than federal 
preemption. 91 
less serious setbacks? Jf commandeered action and inaction are indeed equally accountable, 
or unaccountable, as we ar1,rued above, we see no reason for this asymmetry. 
It has been suggested to us that the anticommandeering doctrine is tyranny-reducing, 
not in the short-run sense that particular acts of commandeering are particularly likely to 
be unaccountable or problematic, but in the long-run sense that commandeering enfeebles 
the states as institutions capable of resisting the national government. Given the host of 
ways in which preemption and commandeering can symmetrically enfeeble states, for exam-
ple, by diminishing interstate diversity, by reducing state options and the concomitant in-
trinsic value of state politics, or by diminishing srate resources, we are skeptical about this 
long-run argument as well. 
90 One standard philosophical justification for the action/inaction distinction, the one we 
have just addressed insofar as it bears on Printz and Nao Yot·k, is that certain actions are 
morally worse than parallel inaction. See, for example, Kagan, Nonnative Ethics, at 70-78 
(cited in note 78). Another standard philosophical justification is that affim1ative duties are 
more "demanding"-they interfere more with a person's own life plan-than negative du-
ties. See, for example, Bennett, The Act Itself, at 143- 63 (cited in note 74). We doubt, 
however, that this latter justification applies to governmental actors as opposed to private 
individuals. 
91 Professor Hills develops a different argt1ment for the preemption/commandeering dis-
tinction. The argument is subtle, but we take it that Hills, centrally, is willing to concede 
the hann to federalism values caused by preemption. Rather, he claims, the commandeering 
power is uniquely unnecessary for the attainment of national goals. Where Congress needs 
state governments to act, it can purchase action through voluntary agreement with the 
states; by contrast, intergovernmental bargaining is insufficient to secure warranted preemp-
tion, because states would "hold out" for large payments by the federal government. See 
96 Mich L Rev at 855-900 (cited in note 1). We are not persuaded, at least insofar as this 
differential holdout ar1,rument is meant to justify the doctrines set forth in Printz and Nao 
York. First, Hills seems to equate commandeering with a federal duty to regulate, and pre-
emption with a federal duty not to regulate. This is not correct, on our reading of Printz 
and Nao Yo-rk; rather, commandeering equals a federal duty to act, and preemption equals 
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III. THE ExPLICIT DEMARCATIONs: CoOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, 
GENERAL APPLICABILITY, AND ADJUDICATION 
In this Part, we discuss the three lines of demarcation be-
tween permissible and impermissible federal statutes that the 
Court explicidy set forth in both New York and Printz and that 
have been the main focus of scholarly writing in this area: the de-
marcations concerning cooperative federalism, general applicabil-
ity, and adjudication. As we see it, these are demarcations within 
the set of affirmative federal duties, since the federal government 
may permissibly impose negative duties upon state officials as an 
accompaniment to its power to preempt state law. Thus under-
stood, the three demarcations-like the more basic and implicit 
distinction between preemption and commandeering-are not jus-
tified by the values of constitutional federalism. 
A. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
The cooperative federalism demarcation distinguishes between 
so-called "conditional spending" or "conditional preemption" and 
straight commandeering. Congress may not "compel" the states 
a federal duty to refrain from action. If, for example, the federal government obliges a state 
legislature to repeal on existi11g regulation, then that countS as commandeering- because the 
legislature has been obliged to rake the action of repeal-on our understanding of the 
preemption/commandeering distinction. (There is a possible refinement to the action/inac-
tion interpretation mentioned in note 80, for affimlative remedial duties, but a federal duty 
to repeal an existing regulation is not necessarily remedial; it might just be deregulatory.) 
Why should there be lesser holdout problems in securing a state's repeal of an existing 
regulation than in securing agreement not to enact the regulation in the first place? 
Even leaving this point aside, we are not convinced by Hills's argument. Printz and New 
York concern the federal power to impose duties upon state legislatures and executives, not 
the federal power to impose duties upon (n) private persons, (b) federal officials, or (c) state 
adjudicators. Call tbe regime in which the federal government only has the power to impose 
duties upon (a), (b), and (c) the "Baseline Regime." What Hills needs to show, ro justify 
Printz and New York, is that (1) the Baseline Regime must be supplemented by a federal 
power to oblige state legislators and executives to refrain from action (paradigmatically, to 
refrain from regulation), becau.~e of insuperable holdout problems otherwise; but (2) the 
Baseline Regime need not be supplemented by a federal power to oblige state legislators 
and executives to act, because of the absence of significant holdout problems here. We do 
not think Hills bas demonstrated that, or even focused on the problem in this way. Note 
that, in the Baseline Regime, state legislatures could enact regulations that conflict with 
federal law, and stare enforcement officials could prosecute violators, but state and federal 
adjudicators would not impose penalties on the violators. Further, the federal government 
could enact irs own regulations and enforce them through the federal courtS. This is the 
baseline from which the federal government would need to purchase state legislative or 
executive action or inaction; relative to that baseline, we are not convinced that differential 
holdout problems afflict rbe rwo kinds of purchases. 
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to "enact or enforce a federal regulatory program"91 (on our inter-
pretation, to perform actions), but it may "encourage"93 the states 
to do so, either by (1) making the payment of federal monies to 
a state conditional upon the state's performance of the actions, or 
(2) making nonpreemption of state law conditional upon the state's 
performance of the actions. This demarcation was integral to the 
holding of New York, where the Court struck down one provision 
of the federal statute at stake, but upheld two others (correspond-
ing to the two permissible subcategories of conditional spending 
and conditional preemption); and it was implicitly reaffirmed by 
the Court in Printz. 94 
A fair bit of doctrinal work remains to be done in fleshing out 
the precise content of the commandeering/ cooperative federal ism 
distinction. We take it that commandeering occurs where Con-
gress induces state officials to perform actions by threatening a 
sanction for nonperformance.95 The problem then becomes distin-
guishing between the impermissible threat of a "sanction" and a 
permissible threat to terminate federal funding or initiate federal 
preemption unless the action is performed. The Court's basic un-
derstanding of this distinction, at least the basic understanding that 
emerges in New York, seems to be this: If Congress threatens state 
officials with some outcome 0, conditional on their failure to per-
form the actions, where it would be unconstitutional for Congress to 
impose 0 unconditionally, then that counts as commandeering. By 
contrast, if Congress threatens state officials with some outcome 
0', conditional on their fai lure to perform the actions, where it 
would be constitutional for Congress to impose 0' uncondition-
ally, that counts as permissible "encouragement."96 Conditional 
spending and preemption statutes fall on the permissible side of 
this demarcation (because Congress can unconditionally deny fed-
eral funds to the States, and can unconditionally preempt state 
law). By contrast, the following cases, all of which seem intuitively 
91 Printz, 117 S Ct at 2384. 
9l Nt!W York, 505 US at 166. 
~ Sec notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
91 If the imposition of an affirmative but unenforced federal duty upon the states were 
sufficient to constitute commandeering, the Court's frequent references to "compulsion" 
and "coercion'' would be otiose. Sec, for example, Printz, 117 S Ct at 2371 n 2, 2375, 
2379, 2383, 2384; Nw York, 505 US at 149, 161 , 165, 168, 174, 175, 188. 
96 See, for example, Nw York, 505 US at 175-77. 
104 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1998 
to be cases of commandeering, are indeed classified that way by 
the basic test here described: (1) Congress threatens that, unless 
the actions are performed, the state itself will be "fined," that is, 
state tax dollars (untraceable to previous federal grants) will be 
confiscated by federal officers;97 (2) Congress threatens that, unless 
the actions are performed, state officers will be personally fined; 
(3) Congress threatens that, unless the actions are performed, state 
officers will be jailed. 
Note, however, that this basic approach may need to be 
amended if the anticommandeering doctrine is to have practical 
significance. For, given the wide range of outcomes that Congress 
can unconditionally impose, this approach seemingly enables Con-
gress to circumvent the anticommandeering doctrine with ease. 
Tbe problem of "unconstitutional conditions" looms, here as else-
where in constitutional law. For example, what is to prevent Con-
gress from making the payment of highway funds to the states 
conditional upon state enactment of legislation restricting abor-
tion, homosexual sodomy, and the possession of guns near 
schools?98 What is to prevent Congress from threatening that, 
where a state fails to enact and enforce a particular program 
to regulate nuclear waste, all waste-disposal laws (or all environ-
mental laws!) in that state will be preempted?99 Either the 
commandeering/ cooperative federalism distinction will be refined 
by the Court, such that certain action-inducing threats will count 
as commandeering, notwithstanding the fact that the threatened 
outcome could be imposed unconditionally; or, seemingly, the no-
commandeering prohibition will become a formality. 100 
We doubt that the Court will succeed in refining the 
commandeering/ cooperative federalism demarcation in a coherent 
and workable fashion. In the area of conditional spending, there 
97 See New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946) (indicating that Congress cannot levy 
tax falling only upon the States). 
911 Sec, for example, South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (upholding federal statute 
that conditioned highway funds upon state adoption of 21 as the drinking age); Virginia v 
81·owner, 80 F3d 869 (4th Cir 1996) (upholding federal statute that conditioned highway 
funds upon acceptable state air-pollution plan). 
90 See, for example, FERC v MissiS$ippi, 456 US at 764- 70 (upholding conditional-preemp-
tion statute, threatening sweeping preemption of state law). 
100 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Pedem/ Spmding aftn· Lcpez, 95 Colum L Rev 1911 
(1995) (discussing risk that Congress's conditional spending power may moot federalism 
constraints on regulation). 
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is in fact a refinement already on the books, one briefly mentioned 
by the Court in New York: the so-called Dole test, which requires 
that a spending condition be "germaneO,'' that is, "reasonably re-
lated to the purpose of the expenditure." 101 But the Court has 
never, in fact, invalidated a conditional spending program for fa il-
ing the "germaneness" requirement-in particular, it did not do 
so either in Dole or in New York itself-and with good reason: the 
germaneness requirement, in its current form, is vacuous. Consider 
three possible conditions upon the granting of federal highway 
funds to the state: (a) that the state maintain the highways in good 
physical repair, (b) that the state raise the drinking age to 21, and 
(c) that the state prohibit gun possession in school yards. Intu-
itively, the first condition is germane, the second (actually upheld 
by the Court in Dote) is a boundary case, and the third is nonger-
mane. But can the intuition be justified? To do so, we need a non-
vacuous criterion for individuating purposes, one that the Court 
has as yet failed to provide. The third condition is nongermane if 
the purpose of the federal grant is "highway safety." But why not 
say that its purpose is "physical safety," including both highway 
safety and safety from gun violence? In theory, an individuation 
criterion might require that a spending condition be germane to 
the "maximally narrow" (but still constitutional) construal of the 
purpose behind the spending program, apart from the condition. 
Even assuming the notion of "maximally narrow" is coherent, it 
is clear that this kind of criterion is much too restrictive to permit 
the spending programs upheld in Dole or, for that matter, New 
York. T he permissible purpose of "maintaining the physical condi-
tion of highways" is narrower than the purpose the Court needed 
to invoke in Dole, namely, highway safety. So some lumping of 
narrow purposes is permissible-but the Court has as yet provided 
absolutely no clue as to the boundary between permissible and im-
pennissible lumping. 
As for the area of conditional preemption, the Court has yet 
even to announce a doctrinal refinement analogous to the Dote 
"germaneness" test-let alone a workable and coherent one. New 
101 South Dakota v Dole, 483 US ar 208; New York, 505 US ar 172. The other part.~ of 
the four-pronged Dole test are nor responsive to the problem of unconstitutional conditions 
raised here. Although Dole further suggests that a spending starute satisfying the test might 
nonetheless be unconstirutionally "coercive," see 483 US at 211, it gives no explanation 
what that means. 
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York simply stated that "where Congress has the authority to regu-
late private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recog-
nized Congress's power to offer States the choice of regulating 
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation"; 102 and Printz added nothing to this 
fonnulation. This unrefined formulation is problematic, as Profes-
sor Rick Hills has explained: "If there are no limitS on Congress's 
power to use conditional preemption, then New York is a meaning-
less formality, because the national government could always re-
quire that state and local governmentS either make policy ac-
cording to federal standards or disband themselves [i.e., have all 
state and local law within the scope of federal power pre-
empted]."103 Indeed, the Court in FERC v Mississippi, the pre-New 
York decision from which conditional preemption doctrine sterns, 
held that Congress could induce state electricity and gas regulatory 
commissions to adopt certain federal policies by means of a sweep-
ing threat of federal preemption. (fhe permissible threat was that, 
if the commissions failed to adopt the policies, state regulation of 
electric and gas utilities would be preempted.) 
In sum, the constitutional permissibility of conditional spending 
and conditional preemption threatens to make the anticomman-
deering rule of Printz and New Yo·rk a practical nullity. But even 
on the assumption that the anticommandeering rule (as eventually 
refined by the Court) turns out to be coherent, workable, and prac-
tically important, we propose a normative critique of the rule: like 
the background demarcation between duties of inaction and duties 
of action, the further distinction between state action secured 
through commandeering versus state action secured through con-
ditional spending or conditional preemption is a distinction poorly 
justified in light of the values that lie behind constitutional 
federalism. 
Once again, the values of innovation and responsiveness to di-
versity can be dispensed with fairly quickly. Straight comman-
deering seems no more likely to produce national uniformity than 
conditional spending or preemption. One might object that, be-
cause Congress must pay for uniformity when it purchases state 
regulation, through conditional spending, the overall degree of 
101 505 US at 167. 
101 Hills, 96 Mich L Rev at 921 (cited in note 1). 
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uniformity (or of unjustified uniformity) is lower than if both con-
ditional spending and commandeering were permissible. Note, 
however, that Congress funds its conditional payments to the 
states through the taxation of resources that would otherwise be 
available for state taxation and for the (geographically variable) 
state programs that state taxation could fund; so the net effect of 
conditional spending as opposed to commandeering on overall 
uniformity is, at best, speculative. As for conditional preemption, 
the cost for the federal government of converting a straight, sanc-
tion-backed directive to state officials into a directive backed by 
the threat of preemption for noncompliance seems to be suffi-
ciently low that the demarcation between conditional preemption 
and straight commandeering cannot be justified on uniformity 
grounds. t04 
Here, as with the preemption/ commandeering distinction, it 
strikes us that a more plausible argument for the Court's new juris-
prudence of federalism rests upon the value of political commu-
nity. Is it not the case that, when Congress compels state legisla-
tors or executives to perform an action-in particular, an 
authoritative utterance-Congress has reduced the set of choices 
available to those officials, derivatively to the state citizenry, and 
has thereby diminished the intrinsic values of democratic participa-
tion and deliberation? By contrast, is it not true that, in the case 
of a conditional spending or preemption program, the state's 
choice set is simply shifted rather than reduced? Prior to the 
threat, the choice set was (perform, not-perform); subsequent to 
the threat, the choice set becomes (perform and receive monies, 
not-perform) or (perform, not-perform and incur preemption). Is 
there not less of an intrusion on the scope of state choice here 
than with straight commandeering? 
In responding to this objection, we will focus on the case of 
conditional spending. (Our analysis carries over, mutatis mutandis, 
to the case of conditional preemption; so as to avoid repetition, 
we will not duplicate the analysis for that case, but rather leave 
the details to the reader.) Technically, commandeering does not 
reduce the state official's choice set. It remains physically possible 
101 See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democr11tic Experimenttllism, 
98 Colum L Rev 267, 419-32 (1998) (arguing rhat conditional federal spending and pre-
emption, like commandeering, threaten interstate variation). 
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for the official to refrain from performing the commandeered ut-
terance. But if the mandate to perform is backed by the threat of 
a harsh sanction, to be imposed personally upon the official, then, 
for purposes of political-community values, the effect on official 
choice is virtually equivalent to a physical constraint. That is, the 
choice for the official shifts from (perform, not-perform) to (per-
form, not-perform and go to jail) or (perform, not-perform and 
pay a large personal fine). Given the large personal stakes for the 
official, it is unlikely that she wi ll choose between the options in 
a manner that advances intrinsic political values- by giving equal 
weight to the interests of each citizen, with no special weight for 
her own interest, and relatedly by sincerely responding to citizen 
proposals and challenges framed in terms of the public good. As 
the Court explained in the Spallone case, where it distinguished 
between sanctions directed at a municipality and personal sanc-
tions directed against municipal legislators: 
The imposition of sanctions on individual legislators is de-
signed to cause them to vote, not with a view to the interest 
of their constiruents or of the city, but with a view solely to 
their own personal interests. Even though an individual legisla-
tor took the extreme position-or felt that his constiruents 
tOok the eXtreme position-that even a huge fine against the 
city was preferable to [complying with a federal court direc-
tive], monetary sanctions against him individuaiJy would moti-
vate him to vote to enact the ordinance simply because he did 
not want to be out of pocket financially. Such fines thus en-
courage legislators, in effect, to declare that they favor an ordi-
nance not in order to avoid bankrupti ng the city for which they 
legislate, but in order to avoid bankrupting themselves. 
This sort of individual sanction effects a much greater per-
version of the normal legislative process than does the imposi-
tion of sanctions on the city for the failure of these same legis-
lators to enact an ordinance.1os 
Indeed, it would be unfair to ask that an official, faced with jail 
or a large personal fine, sacrifice self-concern and thereby permit 
the process of impartial public deliberation to carry on. Con-
versely, in the unlikely event that an official were to assume a su-
perhuman attitude of impartial public spiritedness in the face of 
grave personal threat, and treat that decision as no different from 
101 Spallone v Uniud States, 493 US 265, 279-80 (1990). 
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the ordinary decision C0 between (perform, not-perform), then-
we want to claim-the values of political community would not be 
diminished. 
Consider now a case of commandeering that does not involve 
large personal stakes for the official decisionmaker. Congress di-
rects state legislators, say, to enact a particular statute, and threat-
ens to impose a $10 million fine-to be paid from the state trea-
sury-for each year that the legislation is not in force for the entire 
year. Let us call this the Fine Case. Contrast that with what we 
shall call the Payment Case: Congress conditions a yearly payment 
of $10 million to the state upon the statute's being in force for 
the entire year. It is December 31. In the Fine Case, the state 
legislator faces a choice between (enact the statute, not-enact the 
statute and deplete the state fisc by $10 million). In the Payment 
Case, a case of permissible conditional spending, the state legisla-
tor faces a choice between (enact the statute and receive a $10 
million federal payment, not-enact the statute). One might say 
that, in the Fine Case, "extraneous" considerations have been in-
troduced into the pre-threat choice between (enact, not-enact), 
and that the intrinsic value of the pre-threat choice has been di-
minished. We deny that this is true; the federal government, by 
its own actions and utterances, constantly changes the effective 
choice sets available to state legislators, and unless the federal ac-
tions and utterances are independently unconstitutional (say, under 
ordinary Commerce Clause doctrine), we fail to see how their oc-
currence amounts to the introduction of "extraneous" or "value-
reducing" considerations into state choice-sets. But even if it we·re 
true, our point here is that precisely symmetrical considerations 
are introduced into state deliberations in the Payment Case. The 
state, in that case, no longer faces the baseline choice between (en-
act, not-enact), but the new choice between (enact and receive 
funds, not-enact). The two cases differ only in this: in the Fine 
Case, but not the Payment Case, the federal action in response to 
the legislators' choice is not an action that the federal government 
could take unconditionally. But we do not see how, from the per-
spective of political-community values, that bears on the value or 
importance of state legislators having this choice to make. 
The upshot of this analysis is that the doctrinal line between 
commandeering and cooperative federalism fails to track the value 
of political community. Commandeering, as such, no more under-
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mines state autonomy-specifically, it no more reduces the scope 
and value of the choices open to state officials and state citizens-
than conditional spending or conditional preemption. What does 
(or may) track that value is a cross-cutting distinction-between 
threats to the state itself, and personal threats to state officials-
that the Court has elsewhere recognized (as in Spallone) but spe-
cifically rejected in Printz. 106 
Finally, with respect to the value of tyranny prevention, we con-
cur in Professor Hills's analysis. As Professor Hills crisply puts it, 
"[E]rosion of political accountability is endemic to all forms of 
cooperative federalism." 107 Although cooperative federalism stat-
utes and straight commandeering statutes may both reduce ac-
countability, relative to ordinary federal or state statutes directly 
regulating private persons, the demarcation between cooperative 
federalism and commandeering cannot be justified in terms of 
accountability. 108 
B. GENERAL APPLICABILITY 
In both New York and Printz, the Court intimated that the in-
flexible prohibition on commandeering would not extend to fed-
eral laws of general applicability. Some such distinction is neces-
sary if the prohibition on commandeering is not to immunize 
states and state subdivisions from Commerce Clause regulation 
even more broadly than did the regime of National League of Cities, 
which preceded Garcia and protected only integral state func-
tions.109 An unlimited anticommandeering principle would pre-
clude federal antipollution mandates for municipal trash haulers, 
minimum wage requirements for state universities, or application 
of environmental regulations to the furnaces of local police 
stations. 
The distinction between laws of general applicability and those 
106 See I 17 S Ct at 2382 (decl ining to distinguish between federal statute directed at state 
itself, and federal statute directed at state officers, at lcasr insofar as actions directed are 
official). 
107 Hills, 96 Micb L Rev at 828 (cited in note 1). 
1011 Nor, of course, can it be justified (a Ia De Shaney) in terms of the differential moral 
significance of state action and state inaction, because, to reiterate, the very point of the 
Court's exemption for cooperative-federalism schemes is to create a permissible mechanism 
by which Congress can induce state officials to perform actions. 
109 See Gonia, 469 US at 537 (summarizing National League of Cities regime). 
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which are directed at a protected area of state sovereignty echoes 
other lines of demarcation drawn in constitutional law. The 
Court's negative Commerce Clause doctrine is centrally focused 
on the differential treatment of interstate commerce;110 the Free 
Exercise Clause, as currently construed, is almost exclusively con-
cerned with discrimination against religious actors, and permits 
their activities to be burdened by generally applicable laws; 111 
"content discrimination" triggers heightened scrutiny under the 
Free Speech Clause. 112 Indeed, in wrestling with the comparable 
issue of state immunity from federal taxation, Justice Frankfurter 
championed the position that the primary determination should 
turn on whether the taxes were of general applicability. II) 
But the easy availability of a doctrinal tool does not prove its 
propriety. The exception for laws of general applicability harbors 
both difficulties of definition and of justification. 
First, the concept of "general applicability" is not pellucid. Is a 
generally applicable statute simply one written broadly enough to 
encompass private as well as public entities? In an era of rampant 
privatization, it is hard to identify many governmental functions 
that are not carried out by at least some private entities. A law 
regulating "prisons" would encompass some public and some pri-
vate entities; likewise a statute regulating "adjudicators." If the 
Brady Act had applied to "entities with easy access to information 
about criminal records," rather than "chief law enforcement offi-
cer[s]," 114 thereby including credit bureaus and private investiga-
tors, would that have saved the statute? 
The Court could avoid such difficulties by identifying essentially 
governmental functions: a federal statute targeting such functions, 
even if it included some private actors, would then be taken as 
falling within the scope of the anticommandeering prohibition. In-
110 See, for example, Camp Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v TUW71 of Hamson, 520 US 564 
(1997). 
111 See Employment Division v Smitb, 494 US 872 (1990). 
111 See, for example, Boos v Barry, 485 US 312 (1988). 
111 New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter). See also M'Cul-
locb v Maryland, 17 US 316, 435-36 (1819); Soutb Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514-15 
(1988). It is somewhat awkward for the defender of Primz and New York to rely upon the 
Frankfurter opinion in view of the fact that justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in 
National Ltagut of Citits disparaged it as lacking authority. See 426 US at 843 n 13. 
114 See 117 S Cr ar 2369 (quoting Act). 
112 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [1998 
deed, Justice Scalia's opiruon in Printz steers toward this ap-
proach. 115 But distinguisrung between governmental and nongov-
ernmental functions is a notoriously tricky business. The Court's 
difficulties in specifying conceptually or historically "public" activ-
ities led to its abandonment of the line in intergovernmental tax 
immunity cases, 116 and constituted one ground for abandoning Na-
tional Leag;ue of Cities. 117 Printz itself hardly seemed to involve an 
essentially governmental function; the chief law enforcement offi-
cers purportedly commandeered by the Brady Act were simply re-
quired to check their records. 
In the alternative, the distinction might turn on whether the 
federal regulation in question specifically identified the objects of 
regulation as governmental actors. But here again difficulties 
abound. The rule in Gregory v Ashcroft requires that when Con-
gress seeks to include certain state activities in a regulatory scheme, 
it must clearly so state. 118 Does such a statutory statement make 
the statute targeted rather than generally applicable? If not, then 
what about a federal statute that covers both private and public 
entities, but specifies different duties for the different players? 119 
Or a statutory amendment that includes state officials in a scheme 
that formerly excluded them? 120 
Second, it is far from clear why a regulation of general applica-
tion should be less problematic in terms of the standard federal ism 
values than a targeted regulation. Commentators who are sympa-
thetic to the anticommandeering principle acknowledge that the 
Line between generally applicable and targeted laws is difficult to 
111 See id ar 2383 n 17 ("The Brady Acr does nor merely require CLEOs ro reporr infor-
mation in rheir privare possession. Ir requires rhem ro provide information rhar belongs ro 
the State :md is available ro rhem only in their official capaciry; and ro conduct investigarion 
in their official t'llpaciry, by examining darabases and records rhat only state officials have 
access ro. In other words, the suggestion that extension of this statute to private citizens 
would eliminate the constitutional problem posits the impossihle."). 
110 See Gtwda, 469 US at 540-43 (discussing tax-immuniry cases). 
111 See icl at 537-47. 
118 Sec notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
119 See, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §§ 12131 ct seq (1994) 
(duties applicahlc to public entities); id §§ 12181 et seq (duties applicable to private entities 
that operate public accommodations or services). 
110 See, for example, Mmylnnd v Wirtz, 392 US 183 (1968) (upholding amendmenr to 
Fair Labor Standards Act that removed exemption for certain government employers). 
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defend. 121 An imposition uniformly applied to public and private 
sectors can suppress innovation, impair responsiveness to geo-
graphic diversity, and so on, quite as effectively as one precisely 
targeted at governmental entities. 
Nor are more indirect arguments persuasive. The passage of a 
generally applicable regulation, it might be argued, could signal 
the existence of a national interest sufficiently important to justify 
infringing whatever federalism values might obtain. But this argu-
ment overlooks the fact that the federal legal system regularly and 
in wholly noninvidious circumstances imposes duties on public 
entities that it omits for private parties. Public entities may not 
discriminate against federally protected labor arrangements either 
in their provision of benefits or in regulatory advantages;122 private 
entities may choose their own agendas. Persons acting "under 
color of any [law) of any State" may be sued for violating federal 
statutory mandates in circumstances where no comparable action 
is available against private parties.123 Extortion by public officials 
constitutes a distinct crime. 124 A variety of considerations, ranging 
from the unique ability of state officials to frustrate or further na-
tional policy, to a desire to acknowledge state priorities, to the 
unwillingness of state courts to grant relief against public officials, 
justify this special treatment. 
Reciprocally, it could be claimed that generality of application 
provides the protection of virtual representation; majorities and 
powerful interests who must themselves live with the results of a 
11 1 See Hills, 96 MichL Rev at 916-21 (cited in note I); Deborah jones Merritt, Republi-
can GIJVmmzems and Autonomous States: A New Role fw the Gt1arantee Clause, 65 U Colo L 
Rev 815, 826-27 and n 57 (1994) (arguing that concept of general applicability can be 
linked to Guarantee Clause, but also stating that "a Supreme Court ruling based squarely 
on the Guarantee Clause is preferable to one maintaining the distinction New Ywk sug-
gested between 'generally applicable laws' and laws aimed specifica lly at a state"). 
111 Sec, for example, Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107 (1994) (state government may not 
refuse to prosecute claims of workers who are governed by arbitration clause); Golden State 
Tt'lmsit Corp. v Los Angeles, 475 US 608 (1986) (local government may not condition fran-
chise renewal upon firm's settlement of strike); Wisconsin Dept. of lndustty, Labw and Human 
Relatiom v Gould Inc., 475 US 282 (1986) (state government may not refuse to do business 
with firms that violate federal labor law). 
m See, for example, Wilder v Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 US 498 (1990) (Section 1983 
action for failure to comply with federal reimbursement laws); Golden State Tnmrit Corp. v 
Los A11geles, 493 US 103 (1989) (Section 1983 action for local action that was preempted 
by NLRA). 
110 See Evans v United States, 504 US 255, 261 (1992) (extortion defined as obtaining 
property inter alia "'under color of official right'" pursuant to 18 USC§ 1951). 
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law will be reluctant to permit the federal government to impose 
onerous regulations. As the Court put the matter in the context of 
intergovernmental tax immunities, "[W]here a government imposes 
a nondiscriminatory tax, ... the threat of destroying another govern-
ment can be realized only if the taxing government is willing to 
impose taxes that will also destroy itself or its constituents." 125 
This, indeed, has been the argument of some of the commentators 
who support the distinction between targeted and generally appli-
cable laws. 126 But the argument from virtual representation is of 
dubious value in this context, for the evil that the anticomman-
deering doctrine purports to prevent is not the total destruction 
of state governments (they would be useless to enforce federal 
policy if they were destroyed) but rather their subservience to na-
tional policy. Federal regulation can undermine the values that 
state governments serve-tyranny prevention, political commu-
nity, innovation and diversity-without literally "destroying" 
those governments or, more generally, without imposing require-
ments sufficiently onerous to trigger the generalized outrage pos-
ited by virtual representation theorists. To put the point more 
concretely, we fail to see why a federal requirement that state gov-
ernments properly find obnoxious would necessarily trigger hostil-
ity from private entities who are brought within the scope of the 
requirement. Indeed, in the case where federal regulation hinders 
the responsiveness of state governments to geographically diverse 
citizen preferences, beliefs, etc., one might well expect businesses 
to be less attuned to the local enthusiasms than public officials.127 
Finally, in other areas of constitutional law, general-applicability 
requirements are defended as prophylactic measures to screen out 
problematic governmental motivation. 128 At some points, the 
' 25 South Cm11/ina v Baker, 485 US 505, 525-26 n 15 (1988). 
116 Sec, for example, D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accoumabitity in the National Political 
Pt'Ocess- the Altemative to Judicial Review of Federalimzlssues, 80 Nw U L Rev 577, 648- 51 
(1985); Edward A. Zelinsl,:y, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, tmd The Tenth Amendment: 
On Public Choice, Public Inm·est, and Public Seruices, 46 Vand L Rev 1355, 1385, 1411-12 
(1993). 
117 Thus, for example, Professor Lessig recounts that many southern white business own-
ers in fact supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a means of allowing them to maximize 
profits without offending local norms of racial subordination. Lawrence Lessig, The Regula-
tion ofSociiJl Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943, 965-66 (1995). 
118 The content-discrimination component of free speech doctrine is defended this way. 
See, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation tmd the First Amendmmt, 25 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 189, 227- 33 (1983). 
2] THE NEW ETIQUETTE OF FEDERALISM 115 
Court in Printz seems to defend the general applicability compo-
nent of anticommandeering doctrine this way. 129 But the degree to 
which federal regulations infringe upon the values of federalism 
seems to be wholly independent of the motives or intentions of 
the officials who adopt the regulations. At best, motive or intention 
may be relevant within an expressive account of the anticomman-
deering doctrine-an account that we consider in Part V below. 
C. ADJUDICATION 
The third demarcation explicitly drawn by the Court in Printz 
and New York concerns the nature of the commandeered function. 
The federal government may permissibly commandeer the perfor-
mance of judicial functions by state officials, but it may not compel 
them either to legislate or to undertake the variety of tasks best 
understood as executive rather than judicial (e.g., the investigative 
tasks at issue in Printz itself). Printz made clear that the line lay 
between adjudication and other functions, not between legislation 
and other functions: "Testa [v Katt} stands for the proposition that 
state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law-a conclusion man-
dated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause ('the Judges in every 
State shall be bound [by federal law]') .... [T)hat says nothing 
about whether state executive officers must administer federal 
law." 130 Although the investigative, law-enforcement function 
commandeered by the Brady Act in Printz was not legislative, nei-
ther was it judicial, and therefore directing state officials to per-
form that function was unconstitutional. Printz also stated explic-
itly that the line was a functional one: state officials who were not 
judges were nonetheless subject to commandeering, insofar as they 
performed adjudicatory functions. 
It is within the power of the States, as it is within the power 
of the Federal Government, to transfer some adjudicatory 
functions to administrative agencies, with opportunity for sub-
sequent judicial review. But it is also within the power of Con-
gress to prescribe, explicitly or by implication (as in the legisla-
129 "But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the 
state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, 
such a ' balancing' analysis is inappropriate." Printz, 117 S Ct at 2383. 
IJO Id at 2381 (second alteration in original). 
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tion at issue in FERC (v Mississippi]), that those adjudications 
must take account of federal law.131 
[1998 
Evan Caminker, a prominent scholarly critic of Printz, has de-
nied a textual warrant for the Court's distinction between judicial 
and nonjudicial functions. 132 Professor Caminker has argued, per-
suasively, that there is no specific basis in the Supremacy Clause 
for the judicial/nonjudicial distinction, and we would add that 
there is no specific textual basis for that distinction anywhere else 
in the Constitution. 133 On the other hand, Caminker has not 
shown, nor does he purport to show, that the text of the Constitu-
tion specifically precludes this demarcation. If, for example, the 
demarcation were justified in light of certain federalism values, 
then that demarcation could be constitutionally justified, insofar 
as those values figure in constitutional adjudication (say, via the 
Tenth Amendment). · 
Can the judicial/nonjudicial line be thus defended, in light of 
some or all of the values we described in Pan I? Consider two 
alternate federal statutes. One statute, D, directs a state regulatory 
agency (e.g., an environmental agency, or a health-and-safety 
agency) to enact and enforce certain rules in a particular area, and 
preempts all other rules and all private causes of action in that 
area. A counterpart statute, D', directs the agency to entertain 
specified causes of action, which are granted to private citizens 
(e.g., to persons harmed by pollution, or to injured workers), and 
preempts all rules and all other causes of action in that area. If 
Printz had declined to draw a demarcation between judicial and 
nonjudicial functions, then both D and D' would count as uncon-
stitutional commandeering. D imposes an affirmative obligation 
upon state regulators, and so does D'. For D unconditionally re-
quires the regulators to issue rules and initiate prosecutions, while 
D' unconditionally requires them to issue adjudicative orders con-
ferring benefits (damages or injunctive relief) upon successful 
n l Id at 2381 n 14 (citation omitted). 
Ill See Caminker, 1997 Supreme Court Review at 212-1 5 (cited in note I). 
Ill In particular, the fact that Article m permits Congress to refrain from establishing 
lower federal courts may lend textual support to the exclusion of state judges from the 
anticommandeering rule, but not to the further exclusion of stare officials who are not 
judges but exercise the judicial function, such as the regulators in FERC. See Printz, 117 
s Ct at 2371 (relying upon Article rn to justify imposition of federal obligations upon State 
judges). 
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federa l claimants, whose claims the regulators are, in turn, un-
conditionally required to adjudicate. But, we take it, D' is now 
constitutionally permissible.'34 
Does statute D, in fact, offend federalism values more gravely 
than statute D'? We think not. Statute D imposes a federal policy 
upon the states, by a combination of preemption plus a require-
ment that the agency issue and enforce certain rules. Statute D' 
imposes a federa l policy upon the states, by a combination of pre-
emption plus a requirement that the agency entertain certain 
causes of action. It is very hard to see how D and D' differ, ceteris 
paribus, with respect to the values of responsiveness to diversity 
and innovation. If, for example, the provisions of D' defining the 
commandeered causes of action are quite open-ended, then there 
will be a fair bit of room for interstate variation here. Then again, 
if the provisions of D defining the commandeered rules are quite 
open-ended, there will be analogous room for variation. To put 
the point another way: Commandeering statutes such as D and D' 
differentially facilitate interstate variation insofar as they differen-
tially delegate authority to the states; but it is hard to see how two 
statutes that delegate an equal amount of authority should differ-
entially facilitate variation just by virtue of the function (legislative 
or executive versus judicial) that the statutes commandeer.m 
Consider next the tyranny-prevention function of federalism. 
Here, the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial functions 
cuts the wrong way, at least with respect to certain lcinds of tyran-
nies: the tyranny of organized groups, and official tyranny. There 
is a well-developed literature, both theoretical and empirical, for 
the proposition that agency policy-making through adjudication is 
'~' lY is, in fact, loosely based on the s tatute upheld in FERC v Mississippi. See 456 US 
at 759-61. Insofar as lY simply instructs an existing agency with adjudicatory authority to 
entertain federal causes of actions where the agency has jurisdiction over "analogous" state 
claims, it would not (we take it) be constitu1ionally impermissible despite the fact that it 
constitutes commandeering. See nore 17; FERC, 456 US at 760 (upholding requirement 
that state regulatory commissions can comply with by adjudicating claims, over challenge 
by Mississippi Public Service Commission, because "It] he Mississippi Commission has juris-
diction to entertain claims analogous to those granred by [the federal statute], and it can 
satisfy [the statutory! requirements simply by opening it~ doors to claimant~"). 
Ill Notably, the Court in Pt-i71tz declined to draw a demarcation, either way, along the 
dimension of delegation. See 117 S Ct ar 2382 (rejecting argument that "requiring stare 
officers ro perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does not violate the 
principle of Nw York because it does nO[ diminish the accountability of stare or federal 
officials"). 
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less salient to the general public, and thus more likely to facilitate 
the "capture" of agencies by organized groups or bureaucratic in-
terests, than the relatively high-visibility process of rule making.u6 
The rules impermissibly commandeered by statute D will be more 
salient, not less salient, than the adjudicatory orders permissibly 
commandeered by statute D'. 
The defender of Printz might object here that just because the 
rules are more salient, they are more likely to (unjustifiably) reflect 
majority interests within the state. The judicial/nonjudicial dis-
tinction cuts the wrong way with respect to interest-group and 
official tyranny, but the right way with respect to majoritarian tyr-
anny-or so the defense of Printz might go. While there is some 
plausibility to this line of argument, we think that it faces two 
difficulties: (a) the difficulty of making commensurate different tyr-
anny types that we mentioned in Part I, and (b) the difficulty that 
the tyranny types most relevant to constitutional doctrines that 
limit national power would seem to be official or minoritarian tyr-
anny, not majoritarian tyranny, since a unitary national govern-
ment is particularly prone to the first two types of tyranny, not 
the last. 137 
Finally, consider the value of political community. Do D and 
D' differ with respect to this value? Note, crucially, that in each 
case the commandeered officials are state agency officials-that is, 
officials who are typically unelected. Thus it is hard to see how 
D and D' differentially impede the flourishing of a state poli tical 
community-at least on the standard view that it is via electoral 
politics, paradigmatically, via the lawmaking activities of elected 
state legislators, that intrinsic political values are fostered by con-
stitutional federalism. To be sure, the state agency rule makers and 
prosecutors in D are formally and informally subject to elected 
officials (the state governor and the state legislators), but the same 
is true, or may be true, of the state agency adjudicators in D'. No-
tably, nothing in Printz restricts the applicability of the judicial-
function category to politically insulated adjudicators. For exam-
ple, it is constitutionally permissible for the federal government 
" 6 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sro~11 Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L Rev 
59, 59-60 (1995) (summarizing benefits of rule making). . 
111 See Rapaczynski, 1985 Supreme Court Review at 385-86 (arguing that federalism is 
not tyranny-reducing with respect to majoritarian tyranny, except for the oppression by 
the national government of geographically defined minorities) (cited in note 24). 
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to require that state commissioners adjudicate federal claims and 
defenses-as indeed the federal government did in the starute up-
held in FERC v Mississippi-and Printz explicitly preserves this as-
pect of FERC, even though commissioners are notoriously not in-
sulated from electoral politics. 138 
IV. THE SouRcE OF FEDERAL JlowER: THE REcoNSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS AS BoUNDARIES 
The cases in which the Court has enunciated and elabo-
rated the anticommandeering principle have exclusively concerned 
starues adopted under the Commerce Clause. As a result, there is 
as yet no authoritative guidance concerning how that principle ap-
plies to starutes grounded in other grants of congressional power. 
Prior commentators have generally viewed this as an open ques-
tion, though the majority position has been a tentative conclusion 
that starutes adopted pursuant to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments will fall outside of the prohibition on 
commandeering.139 
In our view, the hesitancy of the commentators is misplaced, for 
a demarcation between federal statutes grounded on the Recon-
struction Amendments, and federal statutes grounded on the Com-
merce Clause or other Article I powers- unlike the demarcations 
discussed in Parts II and III-is well grounded in constitutional 
history, judicial doctrine, and legislative practice, as well as being 
justified by the values of constitutional federalism. We believe, 
however, that the fuzziness of this demarcation- tied as it is to 
the Court's fuzzy doctrine, articulated in the Boerne case, concern-
ing the scope of the power granted to Congress by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments- will make the demarcation, like its less theo-
retically satisfying cognates, a shaky foundation for a workable 
federalism jurisprudence. 
Bs A classic article is Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
Congressima/ Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commissio11, 91 J Pol Econ 
765 (1983). 
1l9 See Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1006 n 13, 1087 n 325; Hills, 96 MichL Rev at 
888-89 (both cited in note !); Merritt, 88 Colum L Rev at 45-46 (cited in note 24); Merritt, 
65 U Colo L Rev at 832 (cited in note 121). Professor Caminker appears recently to have 
gained confidence in the view that the anticommandeering principle is bounded by Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as weU by the parallel enforcement provisions of the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Caminkcr, 1997 Supreme Court Review at 238-
42 (cited in note 1). 
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A. HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 
The proposition that the Reconstruction Amendments are ex-
ceptional, for federalism purposes, is not newly minted for the 
anticommandeering cases. The Supreme Court has long held that 
legislation adopted pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments 
stands on a uniquely strong ground vis-a-vis the claims of 
federalism. 
The issue was fully ventilated in Ex Parte Virginia, 140 where a 
decisive majority of the Court rejected claims that the enforcement 
power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was constrained by considerations of state autonomy. The case in-
volved a Virginia judge who had been indicted and arrested pursu-
ant to a federal statute for excluding African Americans from ser-
vice as grand and petit jurors, and who filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. Joined by a similar petition by the state of Virginia 
itself, the judge claimed that the statute unconstitutionally in-
truded on state autonomy in violation of "the rights of the state 
of Virginia." 14 1 The argument persuaded two justices, Field and 
Clifford, who-relying on antebellum conceptions of federalism 
and cases such as Kentucky v Dennison-argued that nothing 
could have a greater tendency to destroy the independence and 
autonomy of the states; reduce them to a humiliating and de-
grading dependence upon the central government .. . than the 
doctrine asserted in this case, that Congress can exercise coer-
cive authority over judicial officers of the states in the discharge 
of their duties under state laws. It will be only another step in 
the same direction towards consolidation, when it assumes to 
exercise similar coercive authority over governors and legisla-
tors of the States. 142 
Seven members of the Court, however, rejected the attack on the 
federal statute. They did not deny the previous constraints of fed-
·~ 100 us 339 (1879). 
141 Id at 341. 
142 Id at 358 (Field dissenting). Justice Field continued, in language reminiscent of some 
contemporary commentators, "No legislation would be appropriate (under Section 5] which 
should ... conflict with the implied prohibitions upon Congress. They are as obligatory 
as the express prohibitions. The Constitution, as already stated, contemplates the existence 
and independence of the States in all their reserved powers." Id at 361. Justices Field and 
Clifford reiterated their position in dissent from Stmuder v West Virginia, 100 US 303 
(1879). 
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eralism, but recognized that the framing and ratification of the 
Reconstruction Amendments had effected a large change in fed-
eral-state relations. According to the Court: 
[It does not] make any difference that such legislation is re-
strictive of what the State might have done before the constitu-
tional amendment was adopted. The prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to 
a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress 
is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, 
however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, 
or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sover-
eignty .... Indeed, every addition of power to the general 
government involves a corresponding diminution of the gov-
ernmental power of the States. It is carved out of them.14l 
This conception of the Reconstruction Amendments as a pro 
tanto diminution of the immunities otherwise accorded to the 
states has remained firm in the face of succeeding waves of enthusi-
asm for states' rights. Ex Parte Virginitt has been regularly invoked 
by the Court in support of the proposition that the existence or 
threat of violations of those amendments justifies federal infringe-
ment of state sovereiguty. 144 Most recently, during the last period 
of revival of enforceable federalism constraints on the national 
government-the National League of Cities period-the Court re-
peatedly confirmed that constraining doctrines would be qualified 
by the Reconstruction Amendments. In school desegregation and 
other institutional reform cases, federal decrees intruded into the 
prerogatives of state officials in ways that would seemingly145 con-
stitute commandeering: the officials were commanded affirma-
tively to exercise their sovereign authority. The Court, however, 
rejected Tenth Amendment challenges to such decrees.146 
141 100 US at 346. 
144 See, for example, Mitchrmt v Foster, 407 US 225, 240, 242 (1972); South Carolina v 
/(ptzmbach, 383 US 301, 325-27 (1966). 
145 We say "seemingly," given the possible exception from the anticommandeering doc-
trine for certain affirmative remedial duties. See note 80. 
146 Sec MissoUI-i v Jenkins, 495 US 33, 55 (1990) ("The Fourteenth Amendment .. . was 
avowedly directed against the power of the States, and so permits a federal court to disestab-
lish local government institutions that interfere with its commands.") (internal quotations 
and citations omitted); Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 291 (1977) ("[T)here is no merit to 
petitioners' claims that the relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and general 
principles of federalism."); Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658, 690 n 54 
(1978) ("There is certainly no constitutional impediment to municipal liability [under Sec-
tion 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment] .... Natio11ol League of Cities v 
Usery is irrelevant to our consideration of this case."). 
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Similarly, despite increasingly solicitous regard for "the Elev-
enth Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it 
embodies," 147 the Court has remained clear that in the exercise of 
its power under the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress may 
impose otherwise impermissible liability on the states in federal 
courts. In Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, Justice Rehnquist, writing for seven 
members of the Court, quoted Ex Parte Virginia at length to sup-
port the holding that the Fourteenth Amendment constituted an 
"expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminu-
tion of state sovereignty" sufficient to permit Congress to impose 
damage liability on states notwithstanding the Eleventh Amend-
ment. 148 The power of Congress under Section 5 to impose liability 
on states has since remained a staple of the Supreme Court's Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence.149 
Under settled doctrine, Congress may invade state sovereignty 
by appropriate legislation designed to protect against violations of 
the Reconstruction Amendments. The leading case is City of Rome 
v United States, I so where the Court reviewed the application of the 
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act to changes in 
municipal governance, though the changes did not in themselves 
(the Court assumed) violate the Fifteenth Amendment. The City 
of Rome argued that National League of Cities precluded federal 
intervention into the integral state function of self-government by 
popular election, and indeed it is difficult to imagine what function 
lies closer to the heart of state autonomy. Yet the Supreme Court 
rejected the claim on the basis of Ex Parte Virginia and Fitzpatrick 
v Bitzer. lSI 
1" Fitzbatrick v Bitzn·, 427 US 445, 456 (1976). 
,q Id at 455. 
•~ See Idaho v Coeur d'A fme Tribe, 11 7 S Ct 2028, 2039 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy); 
Snnino/e Tribe of Fla. v Fwridn, 517 US 44, 59, 65 (1996); Miss®ri v Jmkins, 491 US 274, 
279 (1989); Dellmuth v Muth, 491 US 223, 227 (1989); Will v Michigan Dept of State Police, 
491 US 58, 66 (1989); AtMcadero Stntt Hosp. v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 238 (1985); Pmnhum 
Statt School & Ho!p. v Haldmnan, 465 US 89, 99 (1984); Maher v Gagne, 448 US 122, 132 
(1980); Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 693 (1978); Pennsylvania v Union GM Co., 491 US I, 
41 (1989) (Scalia concurring and dissenting), overruled, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v Florida, 517 
us 44 (1996). 
uo 446 US I 56 (I 980). 
111 Id at 178-80. The dissenters in City of Rome did not disagree with the proposition that 
Congress may infringe state autonomy so as to vindicate rights under the Reconstruction 
Amendments, but rather rejected the majority's view of the scope of Congress's enforcement 
power. See id at 200-05 (Powell dissenting); id at 209- 19 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
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... Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of fed-
eralism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional 
authority are necessarily overriden by the power to enforce the 
Civil War Amendments "by appropriate legislation." Those 
Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of fed-
eral power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this 
principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate 
state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act.152 
123 
The Court has since reiterated that "when properly exercising its 
power under§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], Congress is not 
limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circum-
scribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers." 153 
It is true that the Court, in our newest period of revived federal-
ism constraints, has not squarely held that the Reconstruction 
Amendments constitute an exception to the current, constraining 
doctrines-namely, the anticommandeering doctrines announced 
by Printz and New York. But last Term's opinion in Yeskey clearly 
suggests as much. The Court's language in Yeskey implies that the 
anticommandeering doctrines limit only legislation adopted pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause, and are inapplicable to a federal stat-
ute appropriately grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. 154 
m Id at 179-80. 
ISl EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226, 243 n 18 (1983). See id at 259 (Burger dissenting); 
Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 US 264, 287 n 28 (1981). To be 
sure, in Gregory v Aslmvft, the Court observed that "this Court has never held that the 
Amendment may be applied in complete disregard for a State's constitutional powers," 501 
US at 468, but Yeskey reads Ashcroft as a case involving canons of statutory construction. 
See 118 S Ct at 1954. The Court's most recent word on the subject is to reaffim1 that: 
"Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep 
of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not 
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved 
to the States.'" Botrne, I 17 S Ct at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v Bitztr, 422 US at 455). As 
this article went to press, the Supreme Court, in a Voting Rights Act case, reiterated the 
position that the "Reconstruction Amendments hy their nature com template some intrusion 
into areas traditionally reserved to the States" and repeated the language quoted above 
from Bomze. Lopez v Momm·ey County, 119 S Ct 693, 703- 4 (1999). 
IH In declining to address the merits of the constitutional challenge to the ADA, the 
Court commented: "We do not address another issue presented by petitioners: whether 
application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power 
under either the Commerce Clause, compare Printz v United States with Garcia v San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Trtmsit Authority, or § S of the Fourteenth Amendment, see City of 8om1e 
v. Fwres." 118 S Ct at 1956 (citations omitted). A fair implication of the comment is that 
Printz limits legislation adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, while legislation 
adopted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment is exempt from that limit if appropriate 
under the standards of Bom1e. To be sure, however, a dictum articulated in the process of 
refusing tO address a substantive issue is not hinding precedent. 
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Given the deep roots of this position, and the reliance of the Court 
in Printz on "historical understanding and practice, . . . the struc-
ture of the Constitution, and . . . the jurisprudence of this 
Court" 155 as the elements used to identify the "'essential postu-
late[s]' " 156 of federalism, there is every reason to believe that the 
Court will confirm this suggestion in a definitive holding when 
the issue is squarely presented. 
A skeptic might respond that interventions under the Four-
teenth Amendment do not require commandeering of the sort 
condemned by New York and Printz. One might argue that, since 
the Constitution protects only against government action rather 
than government inaction, the only legislation required to imple-
ment the Fourteenth Amendment will impose negative duties and 
will thus be a permissible exercise of the federal preemption power. 
But such a response fails to account both for the scope of well-
settled constitutional doctrine and for the legitimacy of congres-
sional action under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent, as well 
as to remedy, constitutional violations. 
The point is clear with respect to the Equal Protection Clause. 
An invidious refusal to provide protection or benefits is as much 
an invasion of the constitutional mandate as an invidious imposi-
tion of punishment. In theory, the former refusal can be cured by 
refusing to provide benefits to anyone; but in practice, such a re-
fusal may be out of the question. Thus equality norms will often, 
in effect, require affirmative action by the state. To take one exam-
ple of particular salience to the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: the Reconstruction Congress was concerned with the differ-
ential failure to enforce state laws against the Ku Klux Klan. 157 
Obviously, a state will not come into compliance with the Four-
teenth Amendment and its implementing statutes by refusing to 
enforce state laws against anyone; rather, state officials will be re-
quired to take affirmative and authoritative action to protect Mri-
can Americans and Union sympathizers.158 
Ill 117 S Cr ar 2370. 
1s6 ld at 2376 (quoting Principality of Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313, 322 (1934)) (alter-
ation in original). 
Ill See Mom-oe v Pope, 365 US 167, 171-83 (1961) (describing this concern), overruled 
on other grounds, Mo1mel/ v Department of Social Se1-vices, 436 US 658 (1978). 
ISs Tbis analysis depends in parr on a matter rhe Court has nor yet addressed: the rightness 
of the connection between the federal directive and action by stare officials, necessary to 
constitute commandeering. lr is as yet unclear whether a directive constitutes impermissible 
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With respect to the Due Process Clause and incorporated rightS, 
the objection has somewhat greater force. But even in the area of 
due process, constitutional doctrine not infrequently requires state 
actors to take affirmative measures to live up to constitutional 
norms, 159 and in such cases an exception for Fourteenth Amend-
ment obligations will be necessary. Moreover, in all areas, it is 
entirely plausible that Congress may legitimately impose some 
prophylactic affirmative obligations. 160 
The Court's failure to recognize a Reconstruction-Amendment 
exception to the anticommandeering principle would disrupt large 
segmentS of our current legal structure. A wide array of federal 
legislation is premised on the proposition that, in implementing 
the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress can impinge on the 
way that state entities choose to structure their internal processes. 
Some of this legislation is contained in conditional grantS like Title 
VI (although even here the capacity of Congress to allow damage 
actions in defiance of the Eleventh Amendment is of some rele-
vance).161 But much other legislation-most prominently Title 
VTI162 and the voting rights legislation sustained in City of Rwu, 
as well as municipal responsibility for deliberate indifference to 
constitutional violations163-also requires the states to take affir-
commandeering only if it logically entails state action, or more broadly if such action is 
effectively compelled. The facts of both Printz and New York suggest the broader view, 
which would give the anticommandeering doctrine wider scope and require more insistently 
the exception for equal protection norms. 
IS• T hus, for example, due process can obligate a state to provide medical services to 
individuals in state custody, see West v Atkins, 487 US 42 (1988); City of Revm v Mass. 
Gm~ml Horp., 463 US 239 (1983); Yormgbet-g v Romeo, 457 US 307 (1982); Estelle v Gambit, 
429 lJS 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment, applied against states via due process component 
of Fourteenth Amendment); and co provide retroactive relief to entities from which unlawful 
taxes have been collected, see Reich v Collins, 513 US 106 (1994); McKesson C()rp. v Division 
of Alcoholic Bevet·ages and Tobacco, 496 US 18 (1990). Although the federal imposition of 
certain affirmative remedial obligations upon the states arguably constitutes permissible pre· 
emption, quite apart from any special exception from the anticommandeering doctrine for 
statures grounded upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see note 80, a Section 
5 exception would surely be needed to accommodate the Youngberg line of cases. 
l60 Although the Court in 8oUTle, discussed in Part IV.C., limited the scope of congres-
sional power under Section 5, Boeme also affirmed that some prophylactic legislation is 
authorized by that provision. See, for example, 117 S Ct at 2163-64. 
161 42 USC§ lOOOd-7 authorizes damage actions against state entities under various fed-
eral civil rights statutes including Title VI, notwithstanding the strictures of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See Fra11klin v Gwimzttt Cormty Public Schools, 503 US 60, 72 (1992). 
161 See Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 448 n 2 (1976) (discussing 1972 amendments, 
extending Title Vll to public employers). 
16
' See City of Canto11 v Hams, 489 US 3 78 ( 1989). 
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mative measures to comply with federal civil rights mandates. The 
Court in Yeskey virtually invited a properly raised challenge to the 
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act that require state 
accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals, but such 
a challenge could not be sustained without overturning large ele-
ments of the federal civil rights regime. 164 
B. JUSTIFICATlON 
The question remains whether a distinction between Congress's 
powers under the Reconstruction Amendments and Congress's 
powers under Article I can be justified. The proposition that Con-
gress must have the authority to override putative state-sovereignty 
constraints, pursuant to its powers under the Reconstruction 
Amendments, is perfectly consistent with the proposition that 
Congress should also have such authority pursuant to its powers 
under the Commerce Clause and the other power-conferring pro-
visions of Article I. After all, although the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment "by their own terms embody limitations on 
state authority," 165 the Commerce Clause has also been understood 
since Gibbons v Ogden 166 to limit state authority, and the Supremacy 
Clause explicitly mentions the states. Nonetheless, we believe that 
a distinction between the Reconstruction Amendments and Article 
I, for purposes of federalism constraints on the national govern-
ment, is indeed justified by federalism values. 
Innovation and diversity. A capacity of state government to experi-
ment with the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment167 
1110 To the extent one can read tea leaves, the ADA might well be sustained against such 
a challenge. The Court denied certiorari after Yeskey in Amtstrong v Wilson, a prison case 
where the Ninth Circuit rejected a plain-statement challenge to the entry of a srructural 
injunction under the ADA, and Clark v Califomia, which held that the ADA was a legitimate 
exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus 
properly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Armstrong v Wilso11, 
124 F3d 1019 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998); Clark v Califumia, 123 
F3d 1267 (9th Cir 1997), ccrt denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998). While this article was in 
press, the Court specifically amended an order granting certiorari to exclude the question 
of whether the ADA exceeds congressional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Olmstead v LC., 119 S Ct 633 (1998). 
16S Fitzpatrick v 8it:zt1; 427 US at 456. 
166 22 us 1 (1824). 
167 For the sake of analytic clarity and simplicity, the following discussion focuses on the 
distinction between Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause; 
but we helieve that our argumentS can he generalized to support a distinction between all 
of the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction AmendmentS and all of Congress's 
Article r powers. 
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cannot rest on the usual federalist arguments about state innova-
tion and responsiveness. The case for interstate variation is usually 
framed in terms of the maximjzation of preference satisfaction (or, 
more generally, the maximization of good consequences). 168 A sys-
tem in which constituent preferences are better satisfied is, ceteris 
paribus, taken to be a superior one; and, at this level, all prefer-
ences are taken to be pretty much equal. In short, the nonnative 
presuppositions underlying the innovation and diversity arguments 
for federalism, as these arguments are usually framed, are straight-
forwardly consequentialist. And the political economy of Com-
merce Clause legislation fits nicely with these consequentialist pre-
suppositions. Such legislation is, for the most part, the product of 
"low" or "ordinary" politics. 
By contrast, a Section 5 determination is (usually) a matter of 
"high politics." It purports to implement basic rights that trump 
(ordinary) measures of good or bad consequences. Indeed, after 
Boerne, legislation grounded upon Section 5 must be commensu-
rate with a threatened or past violation of the Constitution recog-
nized by the Court itself.169 Whereas Commerce Clause statutes 
may serve any plausible account of the national interest, statutes 
under the Fourteenth Amendment must be keyed to preserving 
the rights of individuals under the Due Process or Equal Protec-
tion Clauses. 
The degree to which citizen preferences are satisfied by such 
statutes, or to which they maximize good consequences, is not the 
relevant criterion. Our system of constitutional federalism does not 
contemplate that Americans should lose human rights embedded 
in our national Constitution when they travel from state to state, 170 
and states may not in general legitimately act on the proposition 
that they would prefer not to enforce national norms of equality 
and liberty. The "privt"teges" and "immunities" of citizenship are 
national, not local. 
To be sure, one might argue that a decision by state officials to 
decline compliance with national mandates is a potentially impor-
tant judgment that should be grappled with by the national polity 
163 For a clear example, see McConnell, 54 U Chi L Rev at 1493-94 (cited in note 24). 
169 See Part IV. C. 
170 States may, pursuant to their own constitutions, statutes, or case law, protect these 
interests to a greater degree than the national norms require, but they may not fall below 
the national baseline. 
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in making appropriate decisions about how best to realize constitu-
tional aspirations.171 This argument is not without force, but we 
find it ultimately unpersuasive. 
First, it is worth considering exactly who the participants in the 
dialogue are likely to be. To the extent that the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine protects only against requiring state or local legisla-
tures to adopt statutes according to federal design, the argument 
seems plausible. Legislatures are potential coauthors of an ongoing 
constitutional specification, and the doctrine parallels the Court's 
reluctance to allow state and local legislators to be sued for adopt-
ing unconstitutionallaws. 172 Just as legislative immunity can be de-
fended as a means of allowing state and local challenges and consti-
tutional dialogue regarding controversial decisions of the Court, 
the ability of state and local legislatures to refuse to participate in 
congressional interpretations of the Constitution may be salutary. 
But, as currently framed, the anticommandeering principle is 
hardly so limited. After Printz, it includes every state nonjudicial 
official who exercises governmental power, and there is reason to 
doubt whether the constitutional understanding of the sheriff's 
deputy in Boise, Idaho, the welfare caseworker in New York, and 
the librarian in Huntsville, Alabama, carries the same normative 
force as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 173 Just as the 
Court declines to extend immunity to such executive officials for 
defiance of constitutional norms under Section 1983, there is good 
reason to refuse them the immunity of the anticommandeering 
doctrine. 174 
Second, since every state nonjudicial official has license to par-
ticipate in the dialogue in question, the "discussion" is likely to 
be less than a focused interaction on matters of constitutional prin-
171 See, for example, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Jndicinl Review, 9 1 Mich L Rev 577 
(1993); Rohert A. Burt, The Constitution in C(llif/ict (Belknap, 1992); Louis Fisher, Co1zstitu-
tionnl Dialogues: Imerpretntion as Political Process (Prin<.-eton U Press, 1988); Robert M. Cover, 
The Supreme Com-t, 1982 Term- Foreword: Nomos 011d Nnn'lJtive, 97 Harv L Rev 4 (1983). 
171 See c:1ses cited in note 65. 
t7J See David Yassky, Eros of the Fim. Amendment, 91 Colum L Rev 1699, 1712 (1991) 
(describing Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions). 
17• See Adler, 145 U Pa L Rev at 813-44 (cited in note 45) (arguing that judicial review 
of agency decisions may not be countermajoritarian even if judicial review of statutes is); 
Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Mntte1· of Judicial Review: A C(l1zstituti(l110l Census of tbe 
1990s, 5 Wm & Mary Bill ofRtsJ 427, 506- 08 (1997) (arguing that street-level bureaucrats 
are not likely to be good constitutional decision makers). 
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ciple. When every such official may demand her reservation price 
as the condition of participating in a federal program, what 
emerges is a market that measures the desire of state officials to 
resist national norms. Since these norms represent judgments by 
the national polity that the states are inadequately protecting the 
rights of their minorities in the first place, it is no surprise that 
state officials disagree. T he strength of their disagreement is less 
than· a persuasive ground for rethinking national priorities. 
Finally, the variation that will emerge from normative dialogue 
by states has costs. One of the boasts of America in the aftermath 
of the Civil War is that all have identical rights of national citizen-
ship. The Fourteenth Amendment rejected the proposition in Dred 
Scott11s that national rights are derived from state citizenship. Sec-
tion 5 legislation purports to provide the benefits of the Four-
teenth Amendment to all the citizenry; the interstate equality of 
constitutional rights, and of statutory rights that enforce them, is, 
we suggest, in part what constitutes the United States as a national 
political community. 
Tyranny prevention. In the area of Commerce Clause legislation, 
the outcome of a legitimate state political process may provide a 
locus of justifiable resistance to national tyranny. A tyrannical na-
tional initiative would, on this theory, be met not with armed resis-
tance, but with the increased costs, both political and practical, 
that come from determined noncooperation by state govern-
ments.176 But the theory rests on the premise that the state decision 
of noncooperation is the outcome of a legitimate process-spe-
cifically, in this context, a process that is less likely to be unjustifi-
ably responsive to the interests of particular groups, that is, "tyran-
nical." The theory does not plausibly extend, for example, to trash 
haulers who wish passively to resist the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. The "double security" claim is not a brief for anar-
chy, but for countervailing legitimate public power. 
Unlike Commerce Clause legislation, the mandates of the Four-
teenth Amendment set the parameters of what constitutes a legiti-
mate polity. To the extent that constitutional provisions can be 
Ill Srott v Srmdford, 60 US 393 (1857). 
116 Consider the unsuccessful effortS by New York City to invoke Printz in refusing to 
cooperate with federal anti-immigrant initiatives. City of New York v U11ittd Statts, 971 F 
Supp 789 (SONY 1997). 
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clearly characterized as protecting the elements of a functioning 
democracy, the point is obvious. A decision made by a state entity 
that fails to abide by baseline notions of equality and political par-
ticipation cannot be credited with resisting national tyranny. 
Where it undercuts the very norms that block the capture of state 
governments by powerful factions, state resistance to national 
mandates abets tyranny rather than reducing it. 
The harder case arises where the constitutional rights Congress 
seeks to enforce are not quite so directly connected with political 
participation. 177 Consider, for example, the obligation imposed by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act to affirmatively accommodate 
citizens with disabilities who seek services from state authorities. 178 
The legitimacy of such interventions arises from the nature of 
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. As we noted earlier, 
in federal-state conflicts there are cross-cutting risks of tyranny: a 
failure of federal intervention may permit state tyranny, but impo-
sition of federal determinations risks national tyranny. In the case 
of Commerce Clause legislation, nothing in the nature of the 
Commerce Clause doctrine suggests that such legislation will sys-
tematically represent anything more than the desires of a national 
majority. By contrast, after Boeme, proponents of legislation en-
acted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must per-
suade a court that the legislation is commensurate with the re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At a minimum, then, where the federal courts conclude that fed-
eral intervention is justified under Boerne, the probability of na-
tional tyranny is substantially diluted. Further, to the extent that 
constitutional rights, albeit not protective of the democratic pro-
cess itself, are nonetheless targeted against tyranny in the sense 
that they prohibit outcomes likely to be the result of unjustified 
responsiveness to particular groups or persons- the Takings 
Clause is an example-then a Section 5 statute will be doubly dif-
ferent from the ordinary Commerce Clause statute. In such a case, 
the risk of national tyranny will be lower, and the risk of state 
117 Of course, some commentators claim that large elements of the Bill of Rights are in 
fact crucially linked to the preservation of a legitimate political process. See, for example, 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Dismm: A Theory of Judicial Revie·w (Harv U Press, 1980); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Co11stitution, 100 Yale L J l !31 (199I). 
1111 See 42 USC §§ 1213 I et seq (I 994). 
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tyranny will be higher, as compared to the case where Congress 
is simply operating under the Commerce Clause. 
Political community. The final federalist value we have high-
lighted prizes state decision making because of the intrinsic value 
of democratic politics. But the point we made above about the role 
of the Reconstruction Amendments in defining political legitimacy 
can be repeated here. To the extent that congressional determina-
tions under Section 5 implement constitutional norms that define 
political legitimacy, countervailing determinations by states do not 
promote the value of political community. There is nothing intrin-
sically valuable or important about citizen "participation" in state 
institutions that fail to abide by baseline, legitimacy-defining 
norms of equality and due process. And although, with respect to 
other kinds of constitutional rights, there may in fact be intrinsic, 
democratic values realized by the process of state dissent from fed-
eral statutes enforcing such rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we hope to have shown here how such statutes are suffi-
ciently different from straight Commerce Clause statutes-with 
respect to the remaining federalism values of innovation, diversity, 
and tyranny prevention-to warrant a general exception from the 
anticommandeering doctrine. 
C. LIMITS 
The Fourteenth Amendment is capacious. The Due Process 
Clause protects all "liberty" and "property'' against arbitrary dep-
rivation; the Equal Protection Clause potentially implicates every 
government decision that classifies its subjects. In the absence of 
some limiting principle, therefore, a Section 5 exception from the 
anticommandeering doctrine might reach so widely as to eviscerate 
the practical import of Printz and New York. Almost any federal 
intervention might be, with one degree of persuasiveness or an-
other, justified as an effort to prevent the oppression of some in-
state minority. 179 Similarly, any government action that threatens 
119 For examples of some far-reaching claims, see Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. v 
PUC, 141 F3d 88 (3d Cir 1998) (holding that the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act is Section 5 legislation protecting railroads from discriminatory taXation); Ore-
gon Short Line Railroad Co. v Dept. of Revenue, 139 F3d 1259 (9th Cir 1998) (same); CSX 
Transponatirm, Inc. v Bd. of Public Works, 138 F3d 537 (4th Cir 1998) (leaving issue open); 
Abril v Virginia, 145 F3d 182 (4th Cir 1998) (rejecting the claim that the Fa.ir Labor Stan-
dards Act is Section 5 legislation); id at 185-86 (citing decisions from four other circuits 
rejecting this claim); Biddlecome v University ofTexas, 1997 WL 124220 (SO Tex 1997) 
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the liberty or property of any citizen might conceivably be subject 
to federal regulation as a prophylactic protection against arbitrary 
deprivation. 180 
The Boerne Court adopted a tailoring doctrine to limit the scope 
of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court's standard requires a "congruence between the means used 
and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial mea-
sures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong 
measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted 
response to another, lesser one." 181 The principle appears to have 
two dimensions. First, before it may be accepted as a legitimate 
exercise of enforcement power under Section 5, a statute must be 
shown to be directed toward the remedy or prevention of a harm 
that would be regarded as a constitutional violation under the prin-
ciples enunciated by the Court. Second, the degree of intrusion 
into state prerogatives must be "proportionalO" to the degree or 
likelihood of a constitutional violation. 182 
The Boerne limitations serve to cabin what would otherwise be 
a potentially all-engulfing exception from the anticommandeering 
doctrines, and to bolster the normative case (in light of federalism 
values) for the existence of that exception. Our normative argu-
ments, above, for such a distinction generally assumed that Section 
5 legislation would be fairly closely tied to the underlying constitu-
tional norms. But it bears emphasis that Boerne's tailoring doctrine 
itself is fuzzy, not clear. How well settled a constitutional proposi-
tion must be to support a Section 5 statute, how analogous the 
evil aimed at must be to what the Court would recognize as a 
constitutional violation, how likely the evil at issue must be, and 
how narrowly tailored an intrusion must be to survive scrutiny un-
(holding that Family and Medical Leave Act is Section 5 legislation); Tbumson v Obio Star.e 
Uuiv. Hosp., 5 F Supp Zd 574 (SD Ohio 1998) (holding that FMLA is not). 
180 Compare College Savings Bank v Fla. Prepaid Postseco11dmy Education Expense Btl., 148 
F3d 1343 (Fed Cir 1998) (holding that protection of patent right.~ against: deprivation with-
out due process constitutes a Section 5 basis for statute that permits suit against state for 
patent infringement), cert granted 1999 WL 5331 (US), with College Savings Bn11k v Fin. 
Prepaid Postsecondmy Education E:rpmse Bd., 131 F3d 353 (3d Cir 1997) (rejecting comparable 
claim under Lanham Act), cert granted !999 WL 5330 (US), and Cbnvez v Arte Pt~b/ico 
Press, 157 F3d 282 (5th Cir 1998) (same). See also In •·e Sae1·ed Hemt Hosp., I 33 F3d 237 
(3d Cir 1998) (rejecting "privilege or immunity" clause as basis for nhrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by Bankruptcy Code). 
181 Boeme, I I 7 S Ct at 2169 (citation omitted). 
181 ld at Z 164. 
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der Boerne are all matters of degree. Any one of these variables 
offers room for extensive debate. Since the ultimate judgment un-
der Boerne will be a function of all the variables taken together, 
we have serious doubts whether the tailoring doctrine will prove 
workable. And since the Section 5 demarcation within anticom-
mandeering jurisprudence is tied to Boerne, we similarly doubt the 
clarity and workability of that line, as now drawn by the Court. 183 
V. AN ExPRESSIVE DEFENSE? 
We have argued above that the bases for most of the dis-
tinctions the Court has used to cabin the disruptive potential of 
the anticommandeering principle are at best obscure. On many of 
these fronts, the best explanation one can muster for the lines the 
Court has drawn seems to be that permitted actions "look" or 
"feel" different. So, too, the actual placement of the line between 
permissible and impermissible federal programs is difficult to dis-
cern. The important fact seems to be that some line has been 
drawn, not exactly where the line falls. 
The absence of a (nonexpressive) justification for the lines of 
demarcation combined with the lack of definition of the lines 
themselves suggests that the Court is not so much implementing 
an effort to achieve particular policy goals or to embody particular 
historical understandings as to express what it regards as the core 
of American federalism. In line with the suggestion advanced by 
a number of recent commentators that tl1e law's "expressive func-
tion" may justify rules that are inexplicable apart from what the 
rules "say" or "mean," 184 the prohibition on commandeering as 
defined by the Court could be justified as expressive of our regime 
of constitutional federalism. 
'83 The opinion in Boenze is focused on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But if, 
as we assume, irs tailoring doctrine is also applicable to the parallel enforcement provisions 
of the Thineenth and Fifteenth AmendmentS, our critique can be generaliz.ed: the line 
between a permissible commandeering grounded in one of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, and an impermissible commandeering merely grounded in Article 1, will prove un-
clear and perhaps unworkable. 
1111 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, On tbe E.\tn·e.r.rive Function of Low, 144 U Pa Rev 
2021 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Tbe RegulatiOII of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943 (1995); 
Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, E.>t'(JH!ssive Hrmns, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting 
Rigbts: Evaluating Election-District Apperwm1ces afte,. Sbr1w v Reuo, 92 MichL Rev 483 (1993). 
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The expressive story proceeds at two levels. 185 First, just as it is 
argued that some laws may be valuable as a means of altering the 
norms that are ultimately internalized and implemented by private 
actors, the prohibition of commandeering could be a mechanism 
for strengthening the norm of regard for state interests in the fed-
eral political process. Second, the Court's decisions may be intrin-
sically important for the statements they make. Printz and New York 
may in and of themselves express the nation's constitutive commit-
ment to state autonomy in a way that defines us as a nation. 
A. INSTRUMENTAL EFFECTS ON POLITICAL NORMS 
1. The mechanisms. An instrumental expressive account could be 
fleshed out in several ways. First, the prohibition of comman-
deering could alter the structure of political decision making: by 
forcing federal legislators (or at least legislative assistants) to think 
about where proposed legislation falls on a series of vaguely de-
fined boundaries, the doctrine will, at the very least, temporarily 
put issues of federalism on the legislative agenda. In framing any 
legislation that affects states, a federal legislator must contemplate 
whether the legislation constitutes commandeering or preemption, 
and-if the former-whether it falls within the exceptions the 
Court has recognized to the anticommandeering principle. None 
of these evaluations will necessarily prevent enactment of the legis-
lation, but like rules of etiquette in the private sector, they may 
tend to guard against unthinking violation of relevant values (in 
this case, the values of federalism). 186 
A second, complementary, line of analysis rests on the proposi-
185 These two levels crack Professor Sunstein's account of two types of expressive theories 
of law. Sec 144 U Pa L Rev at 2025-27 (cited in note 184). 
186 The following excerpt from oral argumcm in New Y01·k v United States, sec 1992 US 
TRANS LEXIS 197, •10-•1 I, suggests that the Court understands an anticommandeering 
principle will be indicative rather than determinative: 
MR. SCHIFF: No. We think PERC is quite distinguishable. The majority of 
this Court in PERC made it quite clear that the state had a choice. lt didn 't really 
have to do what that act of Congress required it to do hecause it didn't have to 
regulate public utilities, while-
Q UESTION: Well, you know that it, you know that's a, just a dream world . 
. . . What arc the w1derlying values that you're trying to further by the Tenth 
Amendment argument that you urge upon us? ls it, is this simply just a matter 
of etiquette and form •. the etiquette of federalism, or is there something more 
substantial? 
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tion that the Supreme Court's decisions have independent norm-
generating force beyond th~ specific threat of judicial invalidation. 
When the Supreme Court invalidates commandeering legislation 
as inconsistent with the values of federalism, even if the precise 
reasoning behind the determination is obscure, the Court lends 
support to those who argue against federal legislation on grounds 
of state autonomy. Recognition that the Supreme Court views the 
limitation of federal interference with state decision making as 
constitutionally enforceable could galvanize these proponents of 
autonomy. 187 Within Congress itself, legislators who regard the 
Court as a source of normative guidance will view infringements 
on state sovereignty with a more skeptical eye. To be sure, Con-
gress has not infrequently asserted a willingness to take issue with 
the Court, but the norm-reinforcing effect of the Court's decisions 
need only change the vote of the marginal legislator to be signifi-
cant. At the very least, pro-federalism decisions by the Supreme 
Court make claims of constitutionally based state autonomy a le-
gitimate part of political discourse. 
Third, the anticommandeering doctrine may be a part of a strat-
egy of normative change directed at the federal judiciary itself. A 
requirement that lower court judges engage in the exercise of dis-
tinguishing commandeering from noncommandeering statutes 
might make them sensitive to federalism concerns in other areas. 
This doctrine may constitute one part of a broader revival of state 
autonomy that, along with Lopez, Boerne, and Seminole Tribe, could 
unleash the common-law evolution of federalism jurisprudence in 
the lower federal courts. And allowing state attorneys general to 
invoke Printz in adjudication might embolden them to press feder-
alist claims in other areas. Arguably this has in fact occurred, al-
though it is not often that such " law reform" arguments Qustifying 
legal change in one area of law, by reference to what is needed in 
another) carry the day. 
2. The virtues of ambiguity. In each of these scenarios, the formi-
dable obscurity of the anticommandeering doctrine is arguably a 
benefit rather than a cost. Justice Scalia commented in Printz that 
ISJ Just as Brown v Board of Education and subsequent cases gave social force to claims of 
proponents of African-American rights, the Court's recent series of statutory invalidations 
may provide an impetuS to proponents of state autonomy. 
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"an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority 
is not likely to be an effective one." 188 We have argued that, despite 
this disclaimer, anticommandeering doctrine, as set forth by the 
Court, is in fact made up of a series of "imprecise barriers." For 
purposes of changing political norms, however, unclear boundaries 
may sometimes be better than clear ones. 
Insofar as the point of New York and Printz is to establish .rules 
of etiquette that highlight the importance of state autonomy within 
Congress, the enemy of meaningful ritual is rote. In the normal 
course of events, we might expect the following cycle over time. 
At the first stage, Congress begins to pass legislation without a 
backward glance at state autonomy. At the second, the Court im-
poses boundaries that put federalism back on the agenda because 
they require Congress to affix some sort of formal "seal" indicating 
it has considered federalism. The seal may take the form of a clear 
statement; the inclusion of a background threat of preemption (to 
bring the statute within the permissible category of conditional 
preemption) or a provision applying it to private parties (to make 
it generally applicable); or a statement of findings in the legislative 
history articulating a connection to interstate commerce or consti-
tutional violations. But, whatever the formal prerequisites, in order 
to affix the seal, someone in the legislative process has to think 
about federalism. 
The difficulty, from the point of view of the Court, is that such 
a level of attention will not be stable. If doctrine is predictable, a 
third stage is likely to evolve in which congressional aides discover 
a repertoire of standard techniques that meet the formal require-
ments imposed by the Court, and begin to employ those tech-
niques as a matter of course. Once the forms are safely in the word 
processor, federalism becomes a matter of an aide calling up the 
appropriate language, and Congress returns to its first mode of 
proceeding in routine disregard of state autonomy where politics 
so dictates. 189 
188 117 S Ct at 2381 (rejecting proposed distinction between policy-making and non-
policy-making functions). 
189 This is the equilibrium in the Eleventh Amendment area that emerged in response 
to the clear statement n1le of Atnscndero Stnte Hosp. v Scllnlon, 473 US 234, 238-39 (1985). 
Congress prctry quickly learned the drill. See, for example, Seminole T1·ibes of F/11. v Fl01'id11, 
517 US 44 (1996) (dear statement in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; ahrogation of Elev-
enth Amendment immuniry held ineffective on other grounds); Dellmuth v Mmh, 491 US 
223, 229- 30 (1989) (noting apparent clear statement in amendments to Rehabilitation An). 
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One virtue of an opaque doctrine lies in its ability to delay the 
emergence of the third stage of the process. As long as the Court's 
doctrine lacks clarity, congressional drafters can never be sure that 
any particular rote mechanism will avoid invalidation, and so must 
proceed mindful of the brooding presence of the value of state 
autonomy. Clear boundaries would allow proponents of federal 
legislation to defend appropriately structured interventions on the 
ground that the statutes do not violate norms of federalism. By 
contrast, a doctrine precluding commandeering whose exact pa-
rameters are indeterminate casts a normative pall over every piece 
of legislation that interferes with state activities. Further, as a mat-
ter of judicial realpolitik, an opaque doctrine may be superior, for 
it allows the Court to threaten invalidation of a wide array of legis-
lation, without binding itself to invalidate any particular (and pop-
ular) mandate. In this way, the Court puts federalism on the politi-
cal agenda without depleting its own political capital. 
Finally, if the Court is seeking to inculcate a sensitivity among 
lower courts and governmental officials to the importance of values 
of federalism, clarity is not as much of a virtue as generativity. The 
Court has embarked on a common-law effort to elaborate a series 
of limitations on federal authority. Although it cannot specify ex-
actly what federalism requires, the Court can identify certain cases 
that clearly overstep the bounds, and over time the nature of the 
requirements will be fleshed out by the particular choices it makes 
and the distinctions it draws. To facilitate this process, an initial 
doctrine that throws up a large number of controverted examples 
in the lower courts is preferable to one that allows courts and liti-
gants to resolve issues without reflection. 
3. The dark side of norm manipulation. Although the instrumental, 
expressive argwnent just sketched out has some plausibility-the 
anticommandeering doctrines might be explained as an attempt, 
by the Court, to express regard for federalism and thereby to shape 
norms governing political actors-we are ultimately unpersuaded. 
First, we doubt the empirical presuppositions of the argument. 
So, too, in the area of Commerce Clause re!,•ulation. The practice of deference to congres-
sional fact finding, see, for example, Perez v United States, 402 US 146, 155-57 (197 1); 
Kotzenbacb v McCiullg, 379 US 294, 299-301 (1964), resolved into a ritual announcement 
of an effect on interstate commerce as the predicate for the exertion of national power. 
One function of the lack of clarity of the Court's opinion in United States v Lopez, 5 J 4 US 
549 (1995), is to allow the Court to annotmce the ex.istence of new limits that Congress 
must worry about, without providing easily evaded boundaries. 
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For the anticommandeering doctrines to exert normative force on 
members of Congress and other political actors, the doctrines 
should at least be a subject of discussion. But a LEXIS survey of 
the Congressional Record disclosed only six mentions of Printz. 190 
New York was referred to marginally more often (21 times in six 
years). 191 The cases appear somewhat more often in congressional 
testimony,192 and perhaps this could support a claim that their ex-
pressive effect is the mobilization of interest groups that will raise 
the flag of federalism. But it is equally consistent with the hypothe-
sis that- encased in a doctrine too opaque for most observers to 
justify or fathom-the message has had little serious impact on 
dialogue or decisions by Congress. 193 
190 The reference.~ in 1998 were contained in one article on the inscrutability of Supreme 
Court decisions, authored by a Judge Jerome Ferris, inserted into the Congressional Record 
by Senator Leahy, see 144 Cong Rec S 11872, 11880 (Ocr 8, 1998); cwo claims that preemp-
tion of state products liability laws would be unconstitutional, authored by the National 
Conference of Stare Legislatures and inserted into the Congressional Record, see 144 Cong 
Rec 7707 Ouly 9, 1998); 144 Cong Rec S 7526 Ouly 7, 1998); and a claim by Senator 
Hatch that limitations on attorneys fees in cobacco settlements violate Printz, see 144 Cong 
Rec S 6149, 6168 0 une 11, 1998). The 1997 references were contained in an article insened 
into the record by Senator Leahy which criticized conservative judicial activism, see 14 3 
Cong Rec S 11938, 11939 (Nov 7, 1997); and a list of recent Supreme Court cases, see 
143 Cong Rec S 12023, 12026 (Nov 7, 1997). 
191 ALEXIS search on November 29, !998, of the Congressional Record in the Genfed; 
Record library for "New York v. United States and Date > 1991" yielded 21 citations. 
Nor do the cases appear frequently in legislative history. A November 29, 1998, LEXIS 
search for "Printz v. United Stares or New York v. United States and Date > 1991" in 
the Legis;Cmtrpt library identified only three committee reports. Two involved legislation 
that was crafted to avoid the anticommandeering limitation by attaching requirements ro 
spending programs. See Committee on Commerce, National Salvage Motor Vehicle ConSimrer 
Protection Act of 1997, HR Rep No 105-285 pt I , t05th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 30, 1997); 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, hrtemet Filteriug Systems, S Rep 
No 105-226, 105th Cong, 2d Sess Oune 25, 1998). One involved an assertion that P.,imz 
had little impact because it only struck down an interim provision and "the vast majority 
of local law enforcement officials" complied voluntarily. Committee on Judiciary, Violent 
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S Rep No 105-108, 105th Cong, lst Sess 203 (Oct 
9, 1997) (views of Senators Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feinstein, Durbin, and Torricelli). 
191 A Nov 29, 1998, LEXIS search for "Printz v. United States" in the Legis;Cngrst 
library of testimony before congressional committees yielded 21 citations; a LEXIS search 
for "New York v. United States and Date> 1991" yielded 47 citations. 
19J ft might be argued that the Court's overall activism in the area of federalism has raised 
the profile of Tenth Amendment constraints on federal authority, even though no particular 
case is mentioned in congressional debate. The evidence here might initially suggest such 
an effect. Our LEXIS research revealed that, in the six years between June 1986 and July 
1992, the Tenth Amendment was mentioned in 88 docwnents in the Congressional Record; 
the period between June I 992 (following Ntw York) and July 1998 contains 287 documents 
mentioning the Tenth Amendment. But the profile of these mentions makes another expla-
nation more likely. The period 1992-93 contains 17 documents mentioning the Tenth 
Amendment; 1993- 94 contains 21. In 1994-95 the documents surge to 108, but 1995-96 
contains 63 documents, 1996- 97 contains 34, and 1997-98 contains 44. The fact that the 
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The second difficulty with an expressive justification is that, 
whatever the impact on norms of political discourse and decision 
making, the Court's message is conveyed by invalidating duly en-
acted federal statutes. Invalidation may impose substantial collat-
eral damage on real people and entities who seek the benefits of 
the statutes. In both New York and PTintz, the Court was in a posi-
tion to deliver its message essentially cost-free. In New Y01·k, the 
Court upheld two of three mechanisms for implementing the low-
level nuclear waste statute, and these two were likely to be ade-
quate to the task. In Printz, the Court struck down an enforcement 
mechanism for the Brady Act that was due to be superseded in 
short order194 and that, in any event, most states voluntarily fol-
lowed.195 But the reach of the anticommandeering principle is 
hardly limited to issues of peripheral practical importance. The 
doctrine's lack of clarity and potential expansiveness are likely to 
invite activist members of the lower federal judiciary to constitute 
themselves as censors of the federal government in more important 
cases. In these subsequent cases, the opportunity to exhort Con-
gress may not come so cheaply. 
The imperative not to overrule large bodies of existing case law 
has already led the Court to install a series of escape hatches in the 
anticommandeering doctrine. In circumstances where significant 
federal statutes are at stake, we expect the Court to make use of 
those exceptions to allow Congress to work its will, or to find new 
exceptions to permit the statute at hand. With the emergence of 
a patchwork of ad hoc exceptions, the doctrine will lose whatever 
normative force it had initially. 
Indeed, the nature of the federal judicial system itself will im-
pose a continued pressure to abandon the field. The Supreme 
surge in 1994-95 preceded the Court's exertions in l.opez and Seminole Tribe (70 of the 
108 mentions in 1994-95 preceded Lopez, the earlier decision) and subsided at the end of 
the congressional term despite the Court's continued activism persuades us that the increase 
is better accounted for hy the election of 1994 and the Contract with America. For discus-
sion of the political climate of the period and congressional maneuvering on the issue of 
unfunded mandates, see Timothy ]. Conlan ct al, Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of 
Mmulllte Refonn in the 104th Congress, PUBLTUS 23 (Summer 1995). 
194 Specifically, the provisions stn1ck down in Pri11tz were interim provisions, to be super-
seded by the Attorney General's establishment of a national instant background check sys-
tem, which the Act required him tO do by Nov 30, 1998. See 117 S Ct at 2 368- 69. 
195 See Committee on Judiciary, Violent and Repe11t Juvenile 0/fmder Act of 1997, S Rep 
No 105-108, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 203 (Oct 9, 1997) (views of Senators Kennedy, Biden, 
Kohl, Feinstein, Durbin, and Torricelli). 
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Court cannot review every case decided by the lower federal judi-
ciary; its doctrine w111 be applied by a series of lower court judges 
around the country. In the absence of some doctrinal regu larity, 
the total work product of the judiciary will collapse into an un-
workable hodgepodge. One of the potential virtues of the kind of 
common-law approach followed by the Court in the anticomman-
deering area is the treatment of similarly situated individuals and 
institutions in a similar fashion. But, absent some degree of doc-
trinal predictability, congressional authority will vary from circuit 
to circuit, and neither state nor federa l officials will be able to 
foresee the scope of their legal authority. The easiest way for the 
Court to avoid a flood of federa lism litigation, and to achieve pre-
dictability and uniformity, will be to abandon the fie ld. This was 
the fate of National League of Cities, and the decision to dodge the 
constitutional issue in Yeskey, combined with the denial of certio-
rari in the parallel case raising the question whether the ADA is 
Section 5 legislation, 196 suggests that the Supreme Court has 
started down the same road. 
To the extent the Court does in fact sustain some collllnan-
deering challenges, the instrumental difficulty takes on another 
cast. Since, as we have argued, the doctrinal lines between permis-
sible and impermissible exercises of national power are unjustified 
in light of federalism va lues, the damage to the interests of the 
citizenry will be arbitrarily distributed. A doctrine that reinforces 
pro-federalism norms in the political process, at the expense of the 
interests of an arbitrari ly selected segment of the citizenry, is not 
one which does the Court much credit, or which is likely to 
strengthen respect for federalism over the long run. 
B. EXPRESSING OUR FEDERALISM 
Some recent proponents of the expressive function of law main-
tain that the message contained in a law can play not just the in-
strumental role of changing norms, but the intrinsic role of consti-
1~ See Clm·k v Califo171ia, 123 F3d 1267 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 118 S Ct 2340 (1998). 
While this article was in press, the Court followed the pattern of Yeskey and Clark by 
specifically amending an order gran ting certiorari to exclude the question of whether the 
ADA exceeds congre~-sional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Olm-
stead v L.C., ll9 S Ct 633 (1998). 
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turing "the political identity of a state." 197 By parity of reasoning, 
the anticommandeering principle of Printz might express the fact 
and importance of our regime of constitutional federalism-and 
thereby be partly constitutive of that regime-quite apart from 
any effect on the political process. Conversely, one might argue 
that a law that commandeers state officials expresses an under-
standing of the political structure at odds with the core federalist 
commitments of America. 
At one level it is hard to disagree with these kinds of claims, 
since what is expressed to some extent lies in the eye of the be-
holder. If a majority of the Court says that commandeering ex-
presses values at odds with Our Federalism, who can argue? Such 
legislation apparently expresses those values to a majority of the 
Court. 
Still, this is an awfully loose concept with which to make legal 
decisions. As we argued above, it is likely to be unstable. Moreover, 
as it stands, the doctrine is both substantially overinclusive and 
substantially underinclusive relative to federalism values and, relat-
edly, to the subjective reactions of most of the polity. Despite some 
overheated rhetoric surrounding the issue, it is difficult to believe 
that the provisions of the Brady Act at issue in Printz-requiring 
state law enforcement officers to expend reasonable efforts to de-
termine the legality of gun purchases-express disrespect for fed-
eralism sufficient to make them unconstitutional. Does anyone 
think that the Brady Act was really read by a substantial segment 
of the public as the precursor to the elimination of state sover-
eignty? New York might have been a stronger case for the expressi-
vist, but the Court has specifically declined to limit the anticom-
mandeering principle to areas which involve political choices and 
to policy-making. 198 
Reciprocally, given the demarcations that surround it, the antic-
ommandeering doctrine appears to strain at gnats while swallowing 
camels. On any sensible definition of federalism, it is hard to dis-
tinguish-in tenns of regard for state autonomy-the message ex-
pressed by a federal requirement whose sanctions are that a state 
"take title" to nuclear wastes (the requirement invalidated by New 
191 Jean Hampton, Prmisbmmt, Feminism nnd Politicnlldemity: A Cnse St11dy in tbe t'.Xpressive 
Menning of tbe Low, II Can J L & Juris 23, 23 ( 1998). 
198 See Printz, 117 S Ct at 2380-81. 
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York) fro~ the message expressed by federal requirements backed 
by the threat of preempting state law or of eliminating state access 
to federal resources (the requirements upheld in New York). And 
does anyone believe that a total preemption of state gun laws 
would express less intrusion on state sovereignty than the Brady 
Act?199 
To put the point more generally: an intrinsic, expressive theory 
of federalism doctrine, to be plausible, must presuppose some ob-
jective semantic rules for attaching "meanings" to acts of federal 
legislation. But we know of no such rules independent of the feder-
alism values at stake in this area. A federal statute seems to (objec-
tively) say the right thing about federal ism just insofar as it is 
otherwise justified on federal ism grounds. Because the anticom-
mandeering doctrines cannot, we have argued, be otherwise jus-
tified on federal ism grounds, the expressive story fails as well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has presented an internal critique of the anti-
commandeering doctrines emerging in New York, Printz, and 
Yeskey. Someone who denies that a federal structure serves impor-
tant values, or that those values take constitutional status, or that 
the thus-constitutionalized values ought to be judicially enforced, 
will need little persuading that the anticommandeering doctrines 
are misconceived. So we have assumed (without endorsement) the 
view that some federal statutes should be invalidated by constitu-
tional reviewing courts on federalism grounds, and have argued 
that the emerging doctrines fail to sort between permissible and 
impermissible statutes in a coherent and attractive way. 
The proponent of the doctrines might respond that they have 
a textual or originalist warrant. But in fact they have no such war-
rant, as other scholars have shown.200 We hay;e therefore directed 
199 While this article was in press, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to promulgate rules 
concerning local telephone pricing and other nspecrs of local telephone market.~, ro be 
implemented by state commissions. This led justice Breyer, in dissent, to object that "[t]o-
day's decision docs deprive the States of practically significant power, a camel COillJ>nrcd 
with Printz's 1,rnat." AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities Board, 1999 WL 24568, • 32 (US) (Breyer 
concurring in parr and dissenting in part). 
200 See jackson, II I Harv L Rev at 2199-2200; Caminker, 1997 Supreme Court Review 
at 209-17; Caminker, 95 Colum L Rev at 1030-50 (all cited in note 1); Erik M. Jensen 
and Jonathan L. Entin, CO>mnandttring, the T mth Ammdmmt, and the Federal Requisition 
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our attention, instead, to the question whether the lines of demar-
cation constitutive of the anticommandeering doctrines can be jus-
tified in light of standard federalism values, and we have answered 
that question in the negative. It is no response, either, that any 
rule-like doctrines will be underinclusive or overinclusive relative 
to supporting values. For what we have shown-if we have been 
successful-is that the Printz, New York, and Yeskey demarcations 
do not even track federalism values in a probabilistic way, let alone 
perfectly. There is simply no difference, even in general, between 
permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering with 
respect to the values of innovation, diversity, tyranny prevention, 
and political community- and the same is true of all the other 
demarcations except for the Reconstruction Amendment demarca-
tions. Further, the sacrifice in accuracy associated with rule-like 
doctrines ought to be made up by a gain in clarity; and yet the 
doctrines at issue here are generally quite unclear. These norma-
tive failures in the doctrines have, in turn, emboldened us to make 
the positive prediction that the doctrines will soon be abandoned, 
as was National League of Cities a generation ago. A jurisprudence 
that consists of nothing more than some arbitrary rules of "eti-
quette" ought to be, and we hope soon will be, outgrown. 
Power: Nnu York v. United States Revisited, 15 Const Comm 355 (1998). See also Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va L Rev 1957 (1993) (arguing that original 
understanding supports anticommandeering ntle for state legislatures but not executives). 
